内容提要： 中小城镇不仅在基础设施、人力资源、融资渠道等硬条件方面，而且在市场机制、企业制度等软条件方面都无法与大城市相比，然而在许多产品的生产上，中小城镇的竞争力却毫不亚于大城市。是什么原因导致一个地方经济的竞争力能够超脱于它所具备的传统经济条件，主流经济学框架内的理论难以对此给出令人满意的解释。本文试图用一个高度简化的模型说明，从促进分工的角度来看，若市场机制较为完善，人们会倾向于利用市场来组织分工；若企业制度比较完善，人们会倾向于利用企业来组织分工。但若两者都不完善，反而有可能产生一种既非市场、又非企业的分工组织模式，这正是中国许多中小城镇的中国特色的产业集群模式。由此也可以解释“弗里德曼难题”，即没有完善市场机制和企业制度的中国多年来如何维持经济持续高速增长的问题。

关键词： 产业集群 弗里德曼难题 纳什议价 交易费用 企业理论

一、问题的提出

    整个人类历史中只有两个国家曾经在上亿人口的范畴上维持了二十五年的经济持续增长，其中一个是日本，另一个是中国，而后者至今仍维持着前者无法比拟的高速增长并几乎没有下降的趋势。中国经济的持续高速增长受到世人关注的一个重要原因在于，主流经济学框架内难以有理论对这种现象给予合理解释。一国经济增长需要具备的条件不外乎自然资源、人力资源、经济体制、政治体制和社会文化五方面。比较这五方面条件，大概只有劳动力成本相对低廉可以算作是中国的优势，但由于仍然存在许多劳动力成本更低的国家，因而即便这一点优势也并非绝对。如果将眼光放到中国许多中小城镇经济的发展上，实践对于主流经济理论提出的挑战似乎更大。改革开放以来，中国经济的高速增长与中小城镇经济（或乡镇企业经济）的迅速崛起是分不开的，尤其在经济发达地区，如珠江三角洲和长江三角洲，中小城镇经济的发展对形成地区经济的竞争力更是功不可没。比较一下这些中小城镇与大城市的经济发展条件，无论是在资金、技术、人力资源、基础设施方面，还是在市场机制、企业制度方面，几乎都没有优势可言；可是就经济发展的速度和竞争力而言，这些中小城镇与大城市相比却毫无逊色。这一经济现象同样难以用主流经济理论来解释，可说是“弗里德曼难题”在中小城镇经济发展问题上的翻版。

    早在一百多年前，英国经济学家马歇尔（Marshall，1920）就已注意到一些产业在特定地区集群的现象，他将这一特定地区叫做“产业区”。产业区内集中了大量种类相似的小型企业，相互之间形成高度的分工专业化联系。马歇尔认为，工业在一个地方集群能够产生知识和生产技能外溢效应，导致高效率专业机器的采用，形成熟练劳动力集中的市场。这种优势的特点是企业层面的规模报酬不变和整个产业区的外部经济性，既竞争的优势不是来自于单个企业，而是企业间的分工协作。

    波特（Porter，1990）沿袭马歇尔的思路，从商业和管理学的角度阐述经济活动的集群形成竞争优势的机制。他认为，产业集群增强了企业之间的相互作用强度，它从两方面影响产业整体的竞争力：一是能够形成专门的供应商和需求，促进产业的纵向和横向分工发展，有利于基础设施的建设和利用，以及专门的研究机构的产生等；二是增强了企业之间的竞争强度，促成企业的发明创新活动和新技术的利用等。

    20世纪90年代以克鲁格曼（Krugman，1991）为代表的新经济地理学理论为产业集群的产生提供了新的分析视角，它以企业层面的规模报酬递增和不完全竞争的市场结构为假设前提，在迪克希特和斯蒂格利茨（Dixit and Stiglitz，1977）垄断竞争模型的基础上， 从经济活动的内部机制来解释是经济活动的集群现象。按照新经济地理学的观点，消费者偏好多样化的消费，希望产品的品种越多越好，而企业的生产具有规模报酬递增的特征，产品的品种越多，单个企业的生产规模优势就越难以发挥，正是在这个两难选择中，形成以生产同类产品的产业在一个地方集群的现象。同时，新经济地理学还将企业间的分工行为引入对于产业集群现象的说明（Venables，1996），它将企业内部的规模经济与企业外部的规模经济相结合。产业集群的规模扩大，中间投入品的种类更多，分工更细，产品的价格也更低，人们的生活质量提高，从而形成更强的经济集群力。

    产业集群的发生均与某种形式的集群经济有关。马歇尔和波特将产业集群发生的机制归结于企业为了追求外部规模经济，以克鲁格曼为代表的新经济地理学则认为，集群的动力可以来自于单纯的货币外部性，即仅仅是多种品种或产品的生产者的集群本身就可以导致产品的价格降低，从而形成竞争优势，同时也产生新的集群力。

    以上理论对于解释中国中小城镇的产业集群的形成机制有一定的参考价值，不过，我们以为它们还没有把握住中国中小城镇产业集群形成机制的关键。中国中小城镇产业集群的竞争优势也在价格优势上，这一点与新经济地理学理论强调的一样，不过，两者之间的形成机制是完全不同的。从表面上看，中国中小城镇是利用产业集群方式提高分工专业化水平，然而根本的原因在于因为在中小城镇缺乏完善的市场机制和现代企业制度，因此无法通过这两种途径来有效地组织分工。于是产生出一个新的提高分工专业化水平的机制，这就是具有中国特色的产业集群模式。

二、组织分工的方式

    分工能够提高生产效率是经济学中一个显然的命题，没有高度的分工是不可能创造当代庞大而又复杂的产品和技术体系的。以分工水平的深化作为基准，凡是能够提高分工水平的生产组织模式就是具有竞争力的经济模式。市场经济之所以能够胜出自给自足的自然经济，就在于它是在全社会范围内、而不是在各个家庭内部组织分工。计划经济体制虽然能够在一个企业的内部较有效地组织分工，但却不能在全社会范围内有效地组织分工，“企业办社会”的低效率是其弊端的突出表现。然而，分工不会自然而然地发展和深化，因为人们在利用分工提高生产效率的同时，也为参与分工的每一个人利用自己的相对垄断地位要挟他人提供了机会，由此导致的利益争夺行为足以耗竭部分乃至全部的分工潜在利益。因此，在较大的范围内组织分工并非易事。

    市场经济主要通过市场价格机制和企业组织这两种方式组织分工。科斯在《企业的性质》（Ronald Coase，1937）一文中指出，企业和市场这两种截然不同的资源方式都可以用来组织分工，虽然他关心的不是分工及其深化的问题，而是为什么在市场经济中会有这两种不同的资源配置方式同时存在。在科斯看来，市场交易是存在费用的，或者说，使用价格机制是有成本的，当利用企业来完成一些交易比市场的成本更低时，企业就产生了。我们把注意力放在分工上，按照科斯的逻辑，利用市场来组织分工是有交易费用的。

    科斯的关于企业与市场关系的问题提出以后，由于交易费用概念的模糊性，在长达近40年的时间里没有引起人们的重视，此后，威廉姆森（Oliver Williamson，1971，1979）和克莱因（Crawford Klein，1978）等人将交易费用的概念具体化，从而打破了僵局。威廉姆森等人将企业看作是一个以纵向一体化为基本特征、拥有专用性的物质资本和人力资本的实体。与这一特征对应的是若干潜在的双边垄断和特质交易行为，如果将这些特质交易放到市场上用价格机制来协调，将不可避免地产生因人们机会主义行为带来的高额交易成本。自此之后，专用性投资和人们的机会主义行为就成为分析企业与市场关系的重要因素。不难看出，一项新的分工的直接后果就是形成一系列的双边垄断和特质交易行为，因此，利用市场机制推动分工深化的交易费用是显著的，企业的一个明显优势在于有利于推进分工。

    在威廉姆森等人之后，与资产专用性及其相关的机会主义行为导致企业产生的出发点不同，格罗斯曼和哈特（Sanford J. Grossman，1986）、哈特和莫尔（Oliver Hart &John Moore,1990）从另一角度提出企业与市场的关系问题。他们认为，用企业替代市场是有代价的，即当企业中的一方获得剩余控制权和剩余索取权因而增加专用性投资激励的同时，另一方专用性投资的积极性就被削弱了。类比科斯的说法，不仅使用价格机制是有成本的，使用企业也是有成本的，其最大成本就是不能有效地激励人力和资本的专用性投资。

    既然利用市场和企业来组织分工是有费用的，那么，一个国家的市场机制比较完善，分工得以深化，企业制度比较完善，分工也能够深化，如果两者都比较完善，分工就可以达到更高的水平。而我们面临的问题是，如果既没有市场机制优势，也没有企业制度优势，靠什么来深化分工水平，并获得经济整体的竞争力呢？

    其实，外国和中国的经济实践已经解决了这个问题，这就是产业集群现象。我们应该持有的看法是，组织分工并不囿于要么利用市场，要么利用企业的非此即彼的选择。在人类经济发展的过程中，最先只有市场，企业制度是后来才有的一种制度创新。同样，产业集群现象也可以理解为一种制度创新。世界各国的产业集群模式各不相同，中国中小城镇的产业集群现象更有其特色。正是这个中国特色，在组织分工方面，不仅可以避免市场的若干交易费用，还可以在很大程度上缓解企业的专用性投资激励不足和管理费用。我们来说明导致这种优势的经济学机制。

三、利用企业和市场组织分工的费用和条件

（一）利用市场组织分工的费用和条件

    分工合作涉及到若干关联性的物质、人力资本的投资，其中包括（1）可用于分工合作体之外的通用性资产和生产技能（2）只能用于分工合作体内部的专用性的资产和生产技能。

    以两人分工合作为例。简化分析，只考虑人力资本的投入，并假定其以掌握生产技能的方式体现，用时间的长短来衡量。假定生产技能学习时间分解为两部分：专用技能学习时间和通用技能学习时间。分工的起码优势来自于每个分工参与方只需要学习一部分生产技能，从而使合作体总的学习时间得以缩短，可用于生产的工作时间得以增加。

    假定分工参与双方进行的工作所要求的全部生产技能学习时间为T，如果单干，每一方都要付出时间T用来学习。利用分工，双方的学习时间加起来等于T，正好节约了一个学习时间T。分工要能够实行，先要将生产技能的学习时间分解，假定它满足以下关系：

（1）式中tS为专用技能学习时间，tG为通用技能学习时间，下标用以区分不同的分工参与人。

    虽然分工合作可以节约生产技能学习时间，但由于双方的机会主义行为，同时也带来了相互协调的费用。不妨假定参与人i为争夺和界定自己的利益而耗费时间tiN，在市场条件下，这个协调费用以讨价还价和契约签订、执行、监督、仲裁等的时间耗费表现出来，简称为议价费用。tiN是一种浪费，因为它既不能用于掌握生产技能，也不能用于生产。在扣除议价费用tiN后，剩余的分工收益为（2） 这个收益在分工参与双方间分割。

    市场的特点是交易双方处于平等的讨价还价地位，因此，可以利用纳什议价模型来决定双方的利益分配。如何分割剩余A的议价博弈分为两个阶段：第一阶段，分工合作之前，双方没有投入实际上的时间成本，不合作的所得为0。利用纳什议价模型，两人平分剩余A。第二阶段，双方已经投入生产技能学习时间，基于格罗斯曼、哈特、莫尔不完全合约的思想，事前合同的不完全性导致事后的再议价行为，由于双方都有保留收益，它影响各自的讨价还价能力。

    考察第二阶段双方的利益分配问题。设双方分别按比例x和1－x分割分工的收益A。为了能利用纳什议价模型，先要确定合作破裂后各自的所得，即双方分工合作的机会成本。简化分析，假定合作关系一旦破裂，双方各自投入的专用技能学习时间等于白费，所得为各自花费的通用技能学习时间。纳什议价博弈的结果由下式确定：
s.t. （3）
可以得到双方的份额为 （4）
利用（1）式和（2）式，得到各自的利益： （5）

    进一步考察分工参与人的投入行为。由（5）式可得 ，表明参与人i每投入1单位时间用于专用性技能学习只能得到一半的好处。由 表明，通用技能学习时间的投入没有扭曲。专用性投入激励不足的根源在于套牢效应，就是当双方分工合作后，专用性技能学习时间投入越多的一方，讨价还价的能力就越弱。

    利用市场机制组织具有专用性成分的分工，会因为套牢效应引起的交易费用过大，致使分工无法实现。通用性生产技能由于信息对称，容易界定利益，因此，假定市场议价费用只与专用性成份成比例，即双方投入的专用性生产技能学习时间越多，界定和分割各自利益的费用也越高，为此花费的时间也越多。假设参与双方付出的议价时间是相等的，即议价总是一个双方都在场的行为，市场议价费用简化为以下关系： （6）
系数 ，与市场议价效率有关，它随着一国市场机制完善程度的提高而减小。

    分工要能够通过市场来组织，要求参与双方在分工合作之前的期望收益均为正。仍以纳什议价的结果作为分工合作前的期望收益，利用（5）和（6）式，分工实现条件为： （7）

    当时，上式条件有可能不成立，而且两人的工作要求的专用性投资的相对比例越高，通用性投资的比例就越小，分工实现的条件越不容易得到满足。同时，参与分工的关键在于通用性技能学习时间投入较少的一方的收益是否大于零。如果双方分担的生产技能学习时间大约相当，那么通用性技能学习时间投入相对较少对应于专用性技能学习时间投入相对较多。因此，专用性技能学习时间投入较多的一方容易受到对方要挟，处于议价的劣势地位。

    于是可以得出结论：专用性成分越高的分工合作行为，越难以利用市场价格机制来组织。

（二）利用企业组织分工的费用和条件
    企业制度是一个制度创新，它将分工合作体的收益分配权给予掌握专用性技能的一方，使一些在市场条件下不能实现的分工得以实现，为整个经济系统的分工向更高的水平推进提供了可能。其特点为：1）利用权威的方式决定利益分配，自由议价的费用几乎降至0；2）在企业的内部存在官僚、腐败、影响活动等费用，它的大小取决于企业制度的效率；3）越是掌握企业专用性技能和资产的人，在企业内部的“议价”地位一般越高。这一点与市场机制恰好相反；4）企业内部进行的分工在市场上一般不存在，否则将失去企业专用性的价值。

    不妨假定参与人1是企业专用性投资较多的一方，由他掌握企业的剩余控制权和剩余分配权并决定如何进行分工和收益分配。因此，参与人2的行为方式发生变化，在满足参与约束的条件下，他会采取行为谋取自己的利益。比方说：1）参与人2仍然存在专用性投资激励不足甚至偷懒，为此，参与人1要花费时间t1N建立一套激励机制；2）在努力和投入难以测定的情况下，参与人2在市场条件下的议价费用t2N以信息租金的方式表现出来；3）参与人2甚至花费时间通过影响参与人1的决策来提高自己的收益，t2N又以影响费用的方式表现出来。总之，双方仍然要花费时间tN来处理分工参与各方的利益协调，从生产的角度来说，这些时间的花费也是一种浪费，它构成利用企业来组织分工的费用。

    假定参与人2用于企业专用性生产技能的学习时间需要得到补偿，以此作为与参与人1进行合作的参与条件，那么，利用企业组织分工的条件为： （8）

    参与人1优化其收益，有 ，代入上式后，得到利用企业组织分工的条件为 （9）

    专用性投资较多反而成为促成分工实现的有利条件，使得一些原本在市场条件下不能实现的分工可以利用企业制度来实现，分工的水平得以推进。如果一国的企业制度比较完善，表现为tN较小，那么会有较多的分工利用企业来组织。

四、中国产业集群模式的优势

    产业集群是指特定产业以及支撑和关联产业在一定地域范围内的地理集中。许多国家始终有一些产业保持着地理区域相对集中的发展模式，如美国加州的葡萄酒业，意大利的皮具时装业，中国的瓷器产业以及硅谷的现代信息产业。

    为什么特定产业的集群会形成较高的竞争力？当代较普遍的见解是，产业集群的竞争优势来自于以下四个方面：1）接近生产的投入和相应的基础设施；2）熟练劳动力和人力资源市场集中；3）容易获得相关的信息和对生产业绩进行量度；4）形成互补的产品链（Scorsone 2002）。由此可以发现产业集群模式的一个重要的特点是，它不以具备完善的市场法规和先进的企业制度为先决条件。这也是为什么在不具备当代市场经济条件的工业革命时期，就存在产业集群这种经济现象的原因。

    中国的许多产业集群模式更有其特点。在长江三角洲和珠江三角洲的一些经济相对发达的地方，中小城镇（包括乡镇）既没有大城市在筹集资金上的优势，也没有企业制度和市场规制上的优势，它们只能集中力量，以产业集群的方式生产一种或少数几种产品。在产业集群区内部，以家庭或小企业为独立生产单位，每一个生产单位在整个产品的产业链中只能占据由高度分工形成的一个或少数几个环节，而集群区作为一个整体则由众多的生产单位构成高度专业化的分工网络体系。这种模式在经济机制上形成两个效应，不妨称之为“集群锁定效应”和“专用性投资通用化效应”，它们恰好能够克服市场不规范和企业制度不完善的弱点。

1、集群锁定效应
    中小城镇产业集群具有集群锁定效应，它能够有效地克服人们的机会主义行为。在集群区内部，每个生产者由于高度专业化加上直接面对市场竞争，具有很高的竞争力。可是一旦离开产业集群群体，由于掌握的技能过于单一，生产者因缺乏相应的通用性技能而无法生存，没有生产者敢于或能够离开集群群体。

    集群锁定效应与中小城镇产业集群特殊的信息结构结合，形成有效的克服机会主义行为的机制。在中国的中小城镇产业集群区中，生产单位之间相互关系的一个特点是，作为买者，总是与多个卖者同时进行交易，有时不惜购买有差异的同类产品，并不断调整与各个卖者交易的数量。作为卖者，也总是与多个买者同时进行交易，甚至为不同的买者提供有差异的产品。这种交易关系既不像市场的一次性交易关系，也不像企业内部的固定交易关系，而是一种半固定的关系。在人际关系方面，不仅在作为交易伙伴的买方与卖方之间保持着良好的私人关系，而且在处于同一产业链地位的作为竞争关系的生产者之间也保持着良好的信息交流渠道。这种产业集群模式是一个建立在“熟人”关系基础上的复杂的“关系网结构”。在这个关系网中，任何欺诈行为一旦被发现，会很快在交易伙伴中散布开（主要通过同等产业链地位的竞争者之间的信息沟通机制），从而大幅提高欺诈成本。因此，即便没有一套完善的契约的签订、执行、监督以及违约处理等市场法规体系，也能有效地克服人们的机会主义行为。

2、专用性投资通用化效应

    产业集群的专用性投资通用化效应能够有效地克服由于没有良好的企业制度而产生的难以保护专用性投资者利益的缺陷。在产业集群区外部看来是专用性的生产技能，在产业集群区内部则不然。一般情况下，（纵向）分工每深化一步，都会形成单个买方对单个卖方的双边垄断格局，机会主义带来的交易费用在所难免。可是当分工通过多个买方对多个卖方的方式实现时，专用性技能可以以通用性技能的形式表现出来，因为针对某个交易对象进行的投资可以有较大的部分转用于同其他交易对象进行的合作。当然，由于技术创新和产品多样化趋势增强，总有部分生产技能是双边专用的，不合作即作废假定在双边垄断条件下的生产专用性技能，在多对多的交易条件下，有比例b部分可以转化为通用性技能，满足 。当双方不合作时，各自实际损失的专用性技能学习时间为 。从双方讨价还价的角度考虑，不合作的所得为可以转作他用的生产技能学习时间，即 。利用纳什议价模型决定各自的利益份额：
（10）
得到：
（11）
结合（1）式和（2）式，双方的所得分别为
（12）
显然有 ，双方的专用性投资激励都增强了，而通用性投资激励也没有扭曲。

五、中小城镇产业集群推进分工的机制

    中国中小城镇产业集群的优势不仅在于能够克服人们的机会主义行为、提高专用性投资的激励、无需现代企业制度、有利于民间闲散资本的利用等，还在于它能够有效地促进分工。
仍沿用前面的假定，即双方付出的议价时间相等，而且议价的费用与不能转作他用的专用性投资成比例，即
（13）
分工合作能够实现的条件要求双方的预期收益都为正，利用上式和（12）式，可以得到以下分工实现条件：
（14）

    与分工实现条件（7）式比较，这里的分工实现条件具有两方面的优势：其一，市场议价费用减少，由双边垄断条件下的 减少到 ，参与分工合作的阻力大幅下降。其二，对专用性投资一方的利益保护程度提高，有利于分工参与条件的实现。在市场条件下，分工能否实现的关键在于，通用性投资较少或专用性投资相对较多的一方的参与条件是否得到满足。不妨以参与人1的分工参与条件为例，比较分工参与条件（7）式和（14）式，可以看出，参与人1的预期收益多出一项 。当参与人1是专用性投资相对较多的一方时，满足 ，专用性投资较多一方的预期收益提高。

    虽然在产业集群条件下对专用性投资者利益的保护程度没有企业组织高，但比一般市场条件下的情形有根本性的改善，而且改善的程度随集群群体规模的扩大而提高，它通过分工实现条件（14）式中的专用性投资通用化程度的系数b的增大表现出来。重要的是，这个通过对专用性投资激励的增强和专用性投资者利益保护程度的提高来推进分工的机制，是在没有企业制度费用的情况下取得的。

六、中小城镇产业集群形成的条件

    在一个市场机制和企业制度相对完善的（大城市）经济环境中，难以形成上文所说的中国特色产业集群生产模式。现代企业是以企业专用性人力资本和物质资本为基本成分的分工系统，由于组织管理系统自身的整体性要求，管理费用在一定的产出范围内表现出成本固定的特征，导致企业生产在一定范围内的规模收益递增性。一旦人们选择利用现代企业来组织分工生产，新的潜在竞争者就只能以现代企业来组织同类产品的生产才能进入并与在位者竞争。原因主要有二：其一，若以小生产方式进入则因达不到一定的规模无法在内部形成细化的分工，因此不是现代大企业的对手。其二，若以小生产者参与大企业分工的方式进入，即为在位企业生产部分零部件，这样虽然可以达到高的分工水平，但只要是具有双边垄断特征的分工合作，大企业就更容易受到小生产者的要挟。因此，大企业在一开始就不会与小生产者合作，于是导致小生产者无法进入。

    中国的中小城镇产业集群不是建立在生产单位个体的规模收益递增基础上的，它是通过产业集群整体的规模递增效应来体现其竞争力的。从克服人们的机会主义行为和提高专用性投资的激励功能来看，中小城镇产业集群群体的规模越小，内部的交易效率就越低，这是因为当集群群体内的独立的生产单位数目不多时，存在分工深化与避免双边垄断二者不能兼得的困难。然而，一旦某地产业集群模式初具规模，对于新的生产者的进入几乎没有什么资金和技术限制，就会形成一个规模扩大和整体效率提高相互促成的正反馈发展趋势,即形成马歇尔所说的产业集群的外部规模经济性。因此，产业集群群体的整体规模递增效应能否出现，受到产业集群群体的最小规模限制，这给欲以产业集群方式发展经济的中小城镇造成了苛刻的起步条件。但是由于产业集群区中人们来自同一个地方，容易形成了一定的人际关系束缚，往往在产业集群的初期起到良好的粘合剂的作用，由此又降低了产业集群起步的门槛。

    市场价格机制和现代企业制度的共同特点是，其运行是建立在非人格化力量的基础上的，即人们通常所说的依靠法律和制度来约束人们的行为。一般认为，随着中国经济体制的不断完善，经济行为中的人情关系色彩会越来越淡薄，这一趋势确已在许多大城市的经济发展中显现出来。不过，中国改革开放以来的多种经济成分和多种发展模式共存的经济实践也向世人表明：不要轻言一种模式一定比另一种模式优越，也不要轻言东方注重人格化力量的传统难以形成现代的生产力。

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【Abstract】 Although China is imperfect in market mechanism and enterprise system, it has experienced continuous high-speed growth in economy for several years. What is the cause of regional economic competitiveness being able to overcome traditional economic restrictions? It can hardly be explained by prevailing economic theories in reason. This paper employs a highly simplified model trying to demonstrate that lack of perfection in market mechanism and enterprise system may just be the reason why a special pattern of labor division is appeared, which is neither market-oriented nor enterprise-oriented but a distinguish form of industrial cluster in small and medium cities in China, and that this theoretical approach can be applied to explain “Friedman Puzzle”.

【Key Words】 Industrial Cluster, Nash Bargaining Solution, Division of labor, Market, Enterprise

I. Introduction

There are only two countries in the world with continuous economy growth for more than 25 years, that is Japan and China, and high growth rate in China shows no signs of slowdown yet, hence became main focus of economists and experts around the world. One of the most important reasons for this intensifying interest is that, it is hard to provide a reasonable explanation within the mainstream economics frameworks. According to mainstream economics theories, economic growth are based on five advantages, nature resources, human resources, economic mechanism, politic mechanism and social culture. As for China, only comparatively low labor cost might be an advantage among these five elements. However, other countries with even lower labor cost have not achieved such a high economy growth rate as China does. Development of many small and medium sized cities and towns in China proposes even greater challenges to mainstream economics theories. Along with the progress of China’s opening up to the outside world, the economies in small and medium sized cities and towns have been skyrocketing, which is indispensable to fast growth of China economy, especially to the improvement of local competitiveness, with Zhu Jiang Delta and Yangtze Delta are the excellent examples. Their growth rate and competitiveness are no less than those of metropolitans, though fundamental factors of small and medium sized cities and towns are inferior, not only in funds, technology, human resources and infrastructures, but also in market mechanism and corporate institutions. This economic phenomenon is hard to explain by mainstream economics theories as well. Thus we can call it a corresponding version of Friedman Puzzle in economy growth in small and medium sized cities and towns.

Alfred Marshall (1920), an English economist was aware of the concentration of specialized industries in particular localities 100 years ago, and he labeled it as industrial district. Many small businesses specialized in similar industries agglomerated here and linked with each other based on their highly specialized techniques. According to Marshall, agglomeration of an industry engenders overflow of knowledge and producing techniques, and improvement of utilization of high efficient machines, therefore to form a skilled labor market. The characteristic of this advantage are constant returns to scale at firm-level, and an external economy for the whole industrial district, which means advantages of competition are derived from specialization and cooperation, rather than from individual business.

The theory is further developed by Michael E. Porter (1990). Followed Marshall, he elaborated the mechanism of competitive advantages derived from agglomeration of economic activities from business and management angles. According to Porter, industrial cluster enhances the interaction among corporations, and improves competitiveness for the entire industry in two ways. Firstly, it engenders specialized supply and demand, and improves vertical and horizontal development of the whole industry. It also benefits the construction and utilization of infrastructure, helps to set up institutions in specialized areas. Secondly, it strengthens competition among corporations, thus promotes inventions and innovations, and utilization of new technologies.

Furthermore, a new economic geography theory in 1990’s provided a new angle to analyze the generation of industrial cluster. Represented by Paul R. Krugman (1991), the theory elaborates the phenomenon of industrial cluster from internal mechanism of economic actives, on the hypotheses of increasing returns to scale and an imperfect competition market structure, and based on the model of monopolistic competition proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). According to new economic geography theory, customers prefer diversified consuming way; it means customers want more and more kind of products. However, the advantage of production scale is hard to be realized in any individual business, if they provide too many kinds to products because of the increasing returns to scale of production. It is this dilemma that brings corporations which produce similar products to concentrate into localities. Meanwhile, new economic geography theory brings the idea of specialization of corporations into elaboration as Anthony J. Venables (1996) did. He combined the internal and external economy of scale together. The bigger the industrial cluster is, the more intermediate products are needed, and the more specific a business would be. As a result, prices would be lower, thus improves customer’s living quality, and strengthen agglomeration subsequently.

Any formation of industrial cluster is related to some kind of cluster economy. Marshall and Porter contributed the mechanism to pursuing of external economy of scale. But new economic geography theory put it as pure pecuniary externality. They argues that only the concentration of producers of many products can lead to price decrease, helps to originate competitive advantages, and to improve new agglomerations as well.

All the above mentioned theories are helpful to explain the mechanism of industrial cluster in small-medium sized cities and towns in China. However, they did not touch the key point. Although prices advantage does count as new economic geography theory stated, the mechanisms are totally different. It seems that corporations in small-medium sized cities and towns strengthen their specialization by industrial cluster, but the real reason is lacking of sound market mechanism and modern corporation institutions in these cities. It is impossible for corporations to achieve effective specialization by these two means. A new mechanism to improve specialization in production has to set up, bearing our own features.

II. Methods for Division of Labor

Division improves efficiency undoubtedly. Without intensive division, the modern product and technology systems, which is not only huge, but also complex, are impossible. Any organization which can strengthen division is a competent economic model. For example, market economy is more effective than natural economy because the division is spread out among the whole society, rather than in individual household. Planning economy is in between, because it can only implement division in an individual corporation, not the whole society. The biggest disadvantage is labeled as “community created by corporation”. However, specialization can not be born out of the air. It provides opportunities to impose on others based on the comparatively monopolistic advantages, at the same time that it improves efficiency. As a result, the potential benefits of division are offset by grabbing for interests. It shows how difficult it might be to broaden division.

Market price mechanism and corporation are two means of market economy to achieve division. The Nature of the Firm by Ronald Coase (1937) pointed out, that corporation and market are two different resource mobilizations to arrange division. Division and strengthen factors are not his focuses though, but the reason of these two different means existence are. According to Coase, market transactions always carries costs, in other words, you have to pay for the price mechanism. So corporations are set up because it costs less to do transactions internally than by market mechanism. As our main topic is division, so to summarize here, Coase stated division by market mechanism bears transaction cost.

However, economists did not pay much attention to this rather vague conception for nearly 40 years until Oliver Williamson (1971, 1979) and Crawford Klein (1978) made breakthrough to embody it. They put corporations as an entity holding specific material and human resources assets, with vertical integration as their main feature. Some potential multilateral monopoly and special trading behaviors will lead to heavy transaction cost unavoidable by opportunism, if they are adjusted by market price mechanism. Specific investment and opportunism became main factor to analyze the relationship of corporation and market ever since. It is quiet clear that any new division will lead to a series of multilateral monopoly and special trading behaviors, therefore the market mechanism can save a lot of transaction cost by improving division, and one of the most obvious advantages of corporation is its facilitating to division.

Nevertheless, other economists proposed different explanations to the issue of corporation and market. According to Sanford J. Grossman (1986) and Oliver Hart &John Moore (1990), to replace market by corporation system also bearing cost. At the time when one party of the corporation acquires residual claim right and residual rights of control, to enhance motivation of specific investment, the motivation of investment of the other party is weakened. Take Coase’s ideas into consideration, not only price mechanism, but also corporation system is bearing cost, and the biggest cost is failure to improve investment on human resources and other assets effectively.

Therefore, division can be strengthened either by healthy market mechanism, or by sound corporation institutions, it can be even better with both. However, the problem we are facing is that, how to improve division and competitiveness if we have neither.

In fact, economic practices at home and abroad have provided solution already, which is industrial cluster. We should know that organization and division is limited neither to market mechanism, nor to corporation neither. Corporation is a newly developed institution to overcome the shortcomings of market mechanism. Similarly, industrial cluster is a kind of institutional innovation. The industrial clusters worldwide are different, especially that in small-medium sized cities and towns. It is of this feature that can avoid transaction cost, and ease the pressure of lacking in motivation of investment. We will discuss the economic mechanism of the origin of this advantage later.

III. Costs and Conditions of Market and Enterprise Directed Labor Division

A. Costs and Conditions of Market Directed Labor Division

Labor division and cooperation involves capital investments associated with materials and human resources. They can be summed up into two categories: (1) the investments for general assets and skills, which exist outside of the labor division and cooperative body; (2) those for specific assets and skills that is exclusively needed for the division and cooperative body.

Here, we employ a two-men participated example to illustrate. Put simply, only manpower is considered as capital investment in this case and the skill for production is measured with time. We assume the time for learning of manufacture skill is divided into two aspects: time needed for specific skills and that for general skills. The minimal advantage from labor division is that one participant only needs to learn part of production skills, so the total time for all skills’ learning could be reduced and the time for production could be relatively prolonged.

Assuming total time of learning all skills is T, every participant must spent T time to learn all skills if he does it all by himself. However, if the two participants join division of labor, total time for learning by both parties is only T, one T time saving from non-labor division pattern. To realize labor division, the learning time for production skills must be decomposed at first. Assuming the decomposition satisfies following expression:

XXXXFormula （1）

where, tS represents learning time for specific skills, tG represents learning time for general skills, and the subscript is used to distinguish each participant.

Although labor division and cooperation can bring benefit to the time of learning, it also incurs collaborative cost because of the opportunism undertaken by both parties. Just as well, we assume participant i spends as much as tiN time to contend for and insure its own interests. The collaborative expenditure will thus become time consumption on negotiation, contract signing, performing, supervision or arbitration, etc. We call it “bargaining cost” for short. tiN is a wasteful time, unable to be used for skill learning or production. Deducted by bargaining cost, the remained benefit return of the division of labor is:

XXXXFormula （2）

This benefit return is equally distributed between these two parties.

Nature of market transaction affirms equal positions of both parties in bargaining.The benefit distribution can be guided by “Nash Bargaining Solution”. From the game theory of bargaining on the remainder A, we can analyze it in two phases: in the first phase, neither of these two parties invests any time actually. Benefit return from non-cooperation is 0. According to NASH, remainder A is equally shared by these two parties; in second phase, both parties have devoted time on skill learning. Based on the incomplete-contract theory of Grossman, Hart and Moore, the incompleteness of contract beforehand shall result in re-bargaining afterward. Since every party has its own conceived benefit, their bargaining abilities will be affected by this.

With regard to the benefit distribution in second phase, we assume X/1-X is the proportion ratio to distribute benefit A. In order to apply Nash Solution, we must at first define the individual gain upon cooperation breach, that is, the opportunity cost from both parties for cooperation. To simplify, we suppose that, once cooperation is breached, learning time for specific skills is null and individual gain are only the time for learning general skills. Result from Nash game theory is as follows:

XXXXFormula

s.t. XXXXFormula

XXXXFormula （3）

share of each party :

XXXXFormula （4）

from (1) and (2), we got individual gains:

XXXXFormula （5）

Let’s review participant’s investment furthermore. From (5), we get XXXXFormula . That means participant i can only obtain half of its investment on specific skill learning for one unit of time. From XXXXFormula , we learn there actually is no impairment on time of general skill learning. That is the reason of insufficient incentive on specific investment. It is basically rooted from “Deep Lock-in Effect”, where the more is the investment on time of specific skill learning, the weaker is the involved party in bargaining after the division of labor.

In a market directed labor division where specific investment involves, the division is usually hard to realize because of huge transaction cost evocated by “Deep Lock-in Effect”. General production skills are information-symmetrical, so the benefit is easy to define. So we can suppose that “bargaining cost” is only pro rata with specific components, that is, the more is the time spent on specific skill learning, the higher is the bargaining cost on benefit negotiation and distribution and the more is the time spent on it. Assuming bargaining time is equal for both sides, that is, both par ties will appear on same negotiation, the bargaining cost can be simplified as:

XXXXFormula （6）

Where, coefficient XXXXFormula , relevant to the bargaining efficiency, will become less if the degree of market perfection is improved.

If division of labor division is directed by market, the benefit anticipated by both parties before cooperation must be positive. We still use Nash Bargaining Solution to decide the benefit anticipation and, from (5) and (6), we can get the condition for labor division:

XXXXFormula （7）

Once XXXXFormula , above expression may not exit. Moreover, the higher is the portion of specificinvestment, the lower is the portion of general investment and the harder is the condition satisfied for the division of labor. In the mean time, the key reason for a party, who spends less time on general skill learning, to participate the labor division is that its benefit must be higher than zero. If the learning time born by both parties for production is approximately the same, the party dedicated in general skill learning shall spend less than the party in specific skill learning, whereupon the party doing more on specific skill learning is humble in status and vulnerable to coercion from the other side.

Hence, we reach a conclusion: the higher portion of specific engagements is involved in a cooperative activity, the harder can the market price regulation bring effect to the division of labor.

B. Costs and Conditions of Enterprise Directed Labor Division

Enterprisesystemis a systemic creation. It endows power right of benefit distribution to the party who possesses specific skills in the labor division and cooperative body. Therefore, the type of labor division that cannot be performed in market environment can be realized in enterprise condition, and the degree of division of labor may possibly rise to a higher level. Characteristics of enterprise directed labor division bear following features: 1) benefit distribution is decided by authority and the bargaining cost is lowered to nearly null; 2) other cost like, for example, bureaucracy, corruption and influence, is appeared. Its value depends on efficiency of the enterprise system; 3)the person who holds higher proportion of specific skills and assets shall possess higher positions on “bargaining” in an enterprise, just contrary to that of market mechanism; 4) such division of labor in an enterprise can hardly be seen on market, or otherwise, the enterprise shall lose its specific values.

Here, let’s say participant 1 is the party who holds major resource of specific investment in an enterprise. He has the power to control and allocate the remainder benefit, and decides how to divide labor and how to distribute benefit. Accordingly, participant 2 will change its ways in the participation in order to acquire the most favorite interest for himself, of course, under the restriction of participation conditions. For example: 1) participant 2 is insufficiency in specific investment incentive or even shirk. As a consequence, participant 1 have to spend time t1Nto establish an incentive policy; 2) as the effort and investment are difficult to figure out in this case, the bargaining cost of participant 2 is represented as information rental t2N ; 3) sometimes, participant 2 even spends time to influence participant 1 on decision to improve its benefit, and thus, t2N is represented as influence cost. All in a word, both participants must spend time tN to deal with labor division and benefit distribution. From the view of production, it wastes enterprise resource and composes cost of labor division needed in a type of division directed by enterprise.

Supposing participant 2 needs compensation to spend learning time for specific skills and this is the premise for job participation with participant 1, the condition for enterprise directed labor division is:

XXXXFormula （8）

If participant 1 optimizes its benefit, it will have

XXXXFormula . Putting into above formula, we got the condition for the division of labor:

XXXXFormula （9）

Form above expression, we could perceive that more specific investments can facilitate division of labor. Some that are impossible under market environment canbecome true in this case and the level of division is improved. If the enterprise system is perfect in a country, that is, tN is small, more labor divisions shall be realized through enterprise directed mode.

IV. Advantage of the Pattern of Industrial Cluster in China

Industrial cluster refers to a geographical concentration of a special industry along with other supported or associated industries in one region. Many countries have kept this pattern in some industries for a long time, e.g., wine industry in California of American, leather makings and fashion clothes in Italy, porcelains industry in China and modern information technologies in Silicon Valley, etc.

Industrial cluster is comparatively sharper in market competition, why? The overwhelming explanation for the competitive advantages is from four considerations: 1) close to investment for manufacture and identical infrastructures; 2) concentration of skillful labors and human resource; 3) easy acquisition of relevant information and simple measurement for production achievement; 4) mutual compensational product chain ( Scorsone2002).From this point of view, we discover an important character in this pattern of industrial cluster: it asks for no perfect market regulations or advanced enterprise system as a prerequisite.That is right the reason why industrial cluster had already exited in industrial revolution period when there are no perfect modern economic conditions in the market.

Industrial clusters in China are even more particular in character. In the economic developed regions such as Changjiang River Delta and Zhujiang River Delta, small and medium cities (including counties) have nothing of financing advantages or enterprise system and market regulation merit, but they have congregated their energies to manufacture one or few products in an industrial cluster pattern. Inside the cluster areas, family or small enterprise makes up of one basic production unit. Each production unit occupies one or a few links in a production chain and all production units compose a highly professional labor division network. This type of economic pattern brings two effects, might be as well called “cluster lock-in effect” and “specific investment generalization effect”, which happen to overcome the shortcomings of imperfect market and enterprise system.

A. Cluster Lock-in Effect

Industrial cluster of small and medium cities induces cluster lock-in effect, which gives away opportunism behaviors validly. Inside the cluster area, every producer is fierce in rival due to highly professional abilities and direct competition in the market. However, once the producer leaves this industrial cluster, he cannot survive merely on one single skill, not the general skill, so no single producer dares to depart from the cluster entity.

An effective mechanism that overcomes opportunism behaviors can thus be formed by cluster lock-in effect, together with the special information structure in small and medium cities. In the cluster, there exits a special relationship between production units: as a buyer, it usually trades with many sellers at the same time, sometimes even at all costs to purchase the differential product, and the amount of the trade with one partner is always in fluke; likewise, as a seller, it trades simultaneously with several buyers at the same time or even likes to offer differential products at all cost. This type of relationship resembles neither that of once-off market transaction nor that of fixed enterprise transaction, but rather, a kind of half-fixed affiliation.

With the regard of personal relationship, there not only exits a private friendship between transaction partners, the buyer and seller, but also lies a transparent information channel among all producers even though they are rivals. It is a kind of complicated industrial cluster based on “familiarity”. In this “familiarity” network, once a deception is found, it will be aware of to all partners in the network (through the transparent information channel) and the cost for fraudulence is very high. As a result, the opportunism is thus avoided in spited of no a set of perfect market regulations on contract signing, performing, supervision or breach settlement.

B. Generalization Effect of Specific Investment

Generalization effect of specific investment fills up the gap of lack of protection on specialization investors resulted from imperfect enterprise system. Specific skills viewed from outsider are different from that inside the cluster. Usually, every step toward a deeper division of labor (vertically) shall incur a bilateral monopoly from an individual buyer toward an individual seller. Transaction cost by opportunism can, nevertheless, never be avoided. However, once the division happens with multiple buyers vs. multiple sellers, the specific skills can be turned as general ones, since the specific investment bound to a definite buyer can be compensated by other partners in the trade. Of course, as the technical renovation and product variety intense, some of the specific skills are confined exclusively to the two parties and they shall definitely be useless as the bilateral cooperation breaks down.

Assuming that specific skills created for the bilateral cooperation has a portion of b turned to be general skills in the multi-laterals trade, the proportion must satisfy

XXXXFormula . Once the two parties break down their cooperation, time loss for each party on specific skill learning is

XXXXFormula .With the consideration of bargaining, gains of non-cooperation can turn to be specific skill learning time for other cooperation. The time is thus XXXXFormula . We employ Nash Solution to decide their benefit:

XXXXFormula （10）

and get：

XXXXFormula （11）

from（1）and （2）， the respective gain for each side is:

XXXXFormula （12）

Obviously, we got XXXXFormula . From this, we find incentive on specific investment from both sides is intensified and the generalization investment is undistorted too.

V. Promotion Mechanism of Industrial Cluster in Small and MediumCities toward Labor Division

Industrial cluster in small and medium cities not only overcomes opportunism, improves specific investment incentive, needs nothing on modern enterprise system and makes use of individual capitals, but also accelerates division of labor effectively.

We still base on former assumption, that is, the bargaining time spent by both sides are equal and the bargaining cost is proportioned to the specific investment which can not be turned out for other use, namely,

XXXXFormula （13）

Cooperation requires that benefit anticipations from both parties are positive. From above expression and (12), we got the condition for the labor division and cooperation:

XXXXFormula （14）

Compared with (7), we find two advantages contained in this condition: the first, bargaining cost is reduced from XXXXFormula at bilateral monopoly to XXXXFormula at present, and the obstructive for cooperation is minimized; the second, protection on the party of specific investment is strengthened, and the division of labor is facilitated. Under market environment, the key reason for labor division participation depends on whether the conditions of the party who invests more on specialization or less on generalization are satisfied. Let’s select participant 1 as an example for illustration. By Comparing (7) and (14), we find particXXXXFormula ipant 1 has additional item as its benefit anticipation.When participant 1 is the party who endows more on specific investment, namely XXXX Formula, is satisfied, benefit anticipation of this party is improved.

Although the protection on specialization investors under industrial cluster condition is not so intensive as that of enterprise, it can be improved greatly and become larger as the scale of cluster grows. Expansion of coefficient b in expression (14) shows the trend as the generalization degree of specific investment increase. We must notice: this promotion mechanism of labor division is based on specific investment incentive and intensified protection on specialization investor. It has achieved the purpose without any enterprise system cost.

VI. Condition of the Forming of Industrial Cluster

In an environment (metropolis) where market mechanism and enterprise system are relatively completed, it is difficult to form above-said industrial clusters. Modern enterprise is a labor division system of specialization manpower and material capital. The administration cost, due to request of the system’s organization management, is characterized in fixed cost within a certain range. Therefore, the benefit returns increase as the scale of enterprise enlarges. Once the division of labor is based on modern enterprise, new arriver who intents to rival on the same production has to rely on modern enterprise organizations. Reason for that is derived from two aspects: the first, if a new comer enters the market with small production power, as a small producer, it is difficult for him to organize a fair labor division inside such a small-scale enterprise. The enterprise shall never be able to become the counter part of the modern enterprise; the second, if he enters the market as a small producer to provide spare parts for the existing enterprise, the larger enterprise is vulnerable to coercion from the smaller one because there is bilateral monopoly in this cooperation although such cooperation can help a more professional division of labor. And thus, the large enterprise will refuse such cooperation at the beginning and block the way from which the small enterprise enters market.

Contrarily to above situation, competitiveness of industrial cluster in small and medium cities is not dependant upon return increase of individual production unit, but rather, relays upon the increased scale effect of the whole cluster. From the view to avoid opportunism and to improve specific investment incentive, the smaller is the industrial cluster; the lower is the transaction efficiency inside the cluster. Reason for that is simple. When there exist fewer production units in the cluster, it has to choose from either a deeper division of labor or a bilateral monopoly, not both. However, once the cluster is large enough, new comer can easily get into it because of no restrictions on capital or technology, scale of the cluster can thus turn even larger and the whole economic power turns even stronger. Scale and strength of the cluster is in positive feedback, becoming what Michel referred as “outside economic of scale ” of an industrial cluster. From above analysis, we understand whether return increase of the economic of scale appears or not requires a minimal scale of the industrial cluster. It is a sever precondition for the initiation of industrial cluster in small and medium cities. However, as the people in the cluster region come from a similar place, they are easily interlaced by a personal relationship, which, in the beginning of cluster formation, acts as a bond to tie up all individuals, hence the restriction for cluster initiation is mitigated additionally.

A similarity of the market price mechanism and modern enterprise system is that both run upon non-personality structure, that is, human behaviors are confined by laws, regulations or system. It’s a common sense in China that people are becoming more and more indifferent in their personal relationship as the economic system gradually turns perfect. Some metropolises have already showed this trend. On the other hand, however, China’s economic practice in multi-compositions and multi-mode development has also manifested to the world: never hurry to say one pattern is better than the other; and never hurry to say the personality-emphasized oriental tradition is difficult to build up a production power that is required by the modern society.

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