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中西传统自由观的比较 唐士其 |
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Comparative Study of the Concept of Freedom in Chinese
and Western Traditions Tang Shi Qi |
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如果把自由在最一般的意义上定义为一种不存在对于思想和行为的障碍的状态,那么世界上没有任何一个民族在任何时候拒绝这种自由,但它们对于自由的理解与追求的方式各不相同。就此而言,在这里使用具有强烈的西方色彩的"自由"这个词,在某种程度上也就抹杀了它对于不同的文化传统来说必然具有的某些不可通约的特性。就中国的情况来说,从近代以来,以西方的"自由"反对自身传统中的"专制",已经是一个持续了一百多年的话题。这个话题至今仍在持续,说明了这种要求的生命力。但这只是问题的一半。如果我们相信对于自由的追求是人类社会进步的唯一动力这样一个基本的命题,那么就必须承认,如果在中国文化传统中没有一种对于自由的执着,也就没有几千年来中国文化的存在与发展。
如果承认中国传统文化中存在着某种类似于自由的思想观念,那么在这里不仅有一个语言之间转换的问题,即在中国和西方文化的系统之间对围绕"自由"而展开的各种思考进行一系列的概念与语境的等值的替换,而且更重要的是必须在具体的对话环境中通过中西方历史上自由观念的发展的对比,揭示出这两种自由观的相对价值及其缺陷所在,从而最终为人们对自由的更为普遍,也更为具体的理解提供一种新的可能的线索。
一、西方政治传统中的自由观念
古代希腊文化是西方政治思想的渊源,也有不少的政治思想家把西方近代产生的自由主义观念一直往后延伸到古希腊,并以此证明西方文明从一开始就孕育了自由观念的萌芽。在政治思想中,这被称为"伟大的历史传统"的神话。然而,对古代希腊政治思想的实际考察证明,虽然不能说在当时人们的观念中没有自由的思想,但同时应该承认的是,这种对于自由的理解与现代西方的自由观念是具有相当的不同的内涵的。实际上,现代西方的自由思想是近代政治和社会发展的产物,或者说是一种自由的现代表达方式,是古希腊之后,西方政治思想中对于自由的思考经过一系列的转换最终的产物。
在荷马时代的希腊人中间,人们很难找到一种对于自由的正面的体验与感觉。普罗米修斯向人们反复说明追求自由的代价,西西福斯则向世人述说命运的无奈,至于俄迪浦斯王子的传说,则更是典型地体现了一种希腊人对于自由的绝望。翻阅古希腊典籍,能够找到的对自由最早的表述之一是由赫西阿德做出的。在他的一首诗歌中,一只老鹰对被它捕获的夜莺宣称:"是什么让你如此颤栗,你已经被一个比你更强者所捕获,只能随我四处游历。如果我愿意,你也许会成为我的盘中之羹,也许会重获自由。只有蠢货才会反抗强者。
这里反映的是对自由最通常的理解,即一种与奴役相对的状态。当然,从某种意义上说,自由永远只能通过对比加以认识。由于古代希腊城邦普遍存在奴隶制度,各城邦的政治制度也各不相同,所以奴隶与自由民的对比,以及不同城邦公民生活模式的对比就十分自然地成为人们对于自由的理解的出发点。不过,在古希腊,以这种方式理解的自由可能被称为某种"权利"要更为妥当一些。在古希腊的政治思想家当中,亚里斯多德曾经多次提及自由的概念,比如说,在谈到寡头政体与平民政体的区别时,他写道:如果"一个城邦组织内,全部都是自由的公民,而富于资财的人则限于其中的较小部分;其一以自由为标帜,另一则以财富为依据,这些就是寡头和平民两派各各据以争取统治权力的实际基础。" 在论及城邦获得优良的政治生活所必须的基本条件的时候,他又表示:"除了财富与自由之外,正义的品德和军人的习性(勇毅)也是不可缺少的要素。人们倘使要共处于一个城邦之中,就应该各各具有这些要素。前两个要素为城邦所由存在的条件,后两个要素则为城邦所由企求并获致优良生活的条件。" 亚里斯多德并且认为,如果在一个城邦中实现了政治的正义,那么人们就将"在为了达到自足的目的而共同生活的人们之间发现,他们是自由的,而且或者在比例方面,或者在算术方面彼此平等"。
亚里斯多德用"自由"这个概念来表达对于某些政治权利的拥有,这应该是没有什么疑问的。实际上,在古希腊,自由民与奴隶最大的差别,也就在于是否拥有参与城邦政治生活的权利。当然,在亚里斯多德的理解之外,在古希腊还存在着另一种对自由的理解,那就是伯利克里的理解。他在其著名的《葬礼上的演说辞》中说:"我们在政治上的自由扩展到日常生活之中,……但个人生活中的这一切并没有使我们作为公民无视法律。我们的保障在于这样的一种信念,它告诫我们服从管理者和法律,……在雅典,我们按照自己的喜好生活,但我们时刻准备面临一切挑战。虽然我们的习惯来自于闲暇而非辛劳,我们的勇气来自于自然而非人为,但我们却乐意面对危险,我们既不必刻意经历艰辛,但在必要的时候又能够无畏地面对它们,因而比起从来不曾从艰苦中脱身的人们来说,我们具有双倍的优越。"
伯利克里在这里是拿斯巴达与雅典作对比,说雅典人具有比斯巴达人更多的自由,意思是说与斯巴达人相比,雅典人具有一种更加自在舒适的生活方式,也就是说,雅典与斯巴达相比,对于它的公民们施行较少的强制。这仍然是一种相对而言的自由。当然,它的意义在于不仅意味着一种政治上的权利,而且也意味着一种对于个人生活方式的自主选择。这是近代以来西方自由思想的一个基本出发点。从这个意义上说,斯巴达和其他不那么自由的城邦的存在使雅典人更加珍视和发挥他们所享有的自由,更强化了他们的自由的意识。在罗马的政治思想中,我们也可以发现同样的特点(即通过与奴役的对比发现自由)存在。从这里也许可以得出一个附带的结论,那就是在自由的问题上,一种与不自由的对比的存在本身,是对自由的一个重要的促进因素,而对古代中国来说,这种对比的缺乏也许是人们不能更多地从政治与法律的角度界定自由的一个原因。
但也不应该把伯利克里对于雅典自由的赞颂过于理想化,因为无论雅典人还是斯巴达人,对于城邦来说都有一种绝对服从的义务,而他们所能够拥有的自由,不过是城邦允许之下的自由。关键在于,任何公民都不具有反抗城邦哪怕是不公正不合理的行为的权利,苏格拉底之死就是一个典型的例子。这是古代的自由与近代的自由的一个最大的差别所在。苏格拉底之死,以及雅典城邦在伯利克里之后迅速的衰败,使柏拉图对于雅典的自由,以及体现这种自由的民主制度采取了一种极端怀疑的态度。他相信,一种真正的政治,需要的不是个性选择的自由,因为人性的弱点的客观存在必然使这种自由变成一种对个人欲望的放纵。对于柏拉图来说,政治的根本,应该是某种确定的秩序即"正义",是理性对于"意见"和欲望的绝对的支配。这种支配既体现在同一个人的身上,也体现于一个城邦之中,即哲学家对于公共生活的统治。
如果用后代的自由观念来重构柏拉图的思想,那么可能提出这样的一个问题,即真理与自由的关系应该是怎么样的?尽管柏拉图本人并没有明确表达这样的思想,但我们还是可以设想在柏拉图的思想体系中,按照理性生活并且彻底控制了自己的欲望的人是否自由。相信柏拉图应该能够做出一个肯定的回答。这里为后来自由与必然的关系的讨论提供了最初的基础。但是,这种"自由"既不近人情,如同后来亚里斯多德所批判的那样;又具有过分强烈的精英主义的色彩,因为按照柏拉图的理论,只有极少数的人才能具有这种按照理性生活的资格。具体到实际的政治生活当中,柏拉图希望的,显然是为象苏格拉底那样的思想家保证一种思考的自由,但矛盾在于,他所设想的理想国中虽然为哲学家保留了最高统治者的位置,但同时也已经排除了自由思想的任何可能性,因为他设想的是一种完全静止、僵化的、当然按照他的理论也是完美的公共生活的模式(理想国的制度还可以有改进的余地吗?),所以苏格拉底的命运在那里大概也好不了多少。
柏拉图在《理想国》中的设想在相当大的程度上后来被他自己所放弃,所上所说,亚里斯多德对于自由的理解又重新回到了常识的水平上来,亚里斯多德曾经表示,在一种良好的宪法下的生活是一种安全的而非奴役的生活,而这种观点也被托马斯·阿奎那所继承,他并且认为这种生活是自由而且安全的(libertatern et salutem),这是罗马到中世纪之间政治思想中关于自由的观念的一个基本内容。如上所说,与古希腊人一样,罗马人的自由最初同样是罗马人相对于奴隶或者罗马之外的其他民族的人的自由,它同样表现为某些政治与社会的权利。但除此之外,在古罗马,人们对于自由的理解又增加了新的内容,这就是所谓的"共和主义"的传统对自由的理解。这种理解包括两个方面的内容,首先是关于法律与自由的关系。古罗马的政治思想家如西塞罗等人都强调自由应该受到法律的调整从而使其区别于"放任"(licence)。西塞罗本人曾经写道:"任何事物如果走向极端--无论是天气、收成还是人的健康--都会成为它的反面,对于一个国家的政治生活而言尤其如此。极端的自由,其结果只会是极端的奴役,这无论对于人民全体还是公民个人来说都同样正确。纯粹的自由将导致政治上的专制,这将是最不公正的和最残暴的奴役状态。"
传统强调自由在于对法律的服从,但这种法律并不是专制的。西塞罗指出:"只有在人民掌握了最高权力的国家,自由才能找到其安身之所。" 也就是说,自由的一个基本前提是人民全体作为法律的制定者,这正是"共和主义"的精神实质之所在。奥古斯丁也认为,正是对于自由与荣誉的追求使罗马人创造了令人钦佩的业绩。 除此之外,"共和主义"的传统也强调自然法的作用,强调现实的法律最终必须与自然法相一致。这是"共和主义"传统中对于公民自由的第二重保障。由于从西塞罗到阿奎那都强调自然法与理性的内在一致性,所以也很容易由此得出自由是对法律从而也是对理性的服从的结论。
"共和主义"思想的第二个高峰出现在文艺复兴时期的意大利。从十四世纪开始,自由与政体的关系成为意大利人文主义者关注的一个中心话题,而当时的佛罗伦萨共和国则是他们研究的一个典型的案例。早期人文主义者萨鲁塔蒂(Coluccio Salutati)1369年的一封信中就曾写道:没有什么比自由更高贵、更伟大和更有价值。'8 自由是一种"甜蜜的约束"(dulce libertatisfrenum)它意味意在一种支配着全体人民的、基于最公正的平等标准的法律之下生活。布鲁尼(Leonardo Bruni)继承西塞罗的思想,认为佛罗伦萨制度最大的优点在于法律为人们的政治生活确立了明确的规范,国家的各种政治力量得到了适当的平衡,而从根本上说,就是法律保证了自由。他所此断言,没有法律就没有共和国,而没有自由生存就失去了价值。 另外一位人文主义者阿拉马诺在其写于1479年的对话录《论自由》一书中,则明确提出,"政治的自由存在于在法律与习俗的界限之内自由生活的可能性。"他同时认为,一个明智的人能够使自己的情欲服从于理性的约束从而能够实现自由的可能性,而不明智的人由于只能听从于情欲的摆布从而只能把自由转变成无穷无尽的不满与不幸。 但丁也认为,如果一个人是按照他的理性生活的,那他就是自由的,相反,如果他被自己的欲望或者别人的意志所支配,那么他就处于一种奴役的状态。一种腐败的政体把人们降低为奴隶,而一种正义的政体则同时使人们成为品德优良的人和正直的公民。
总的来说,共和主义者以公民制定的法律为中介,把自由与强制统一了起来。在他们看来,如果说一个国家的法律是由人民自己所制定的,是他们的意志的反映,那么对于这些法律的服从自然也是人们自愿选择的结果,因为在这种情况下,他们服从的不是别人,正是他们自己。因此,正如他们在制定法律的时候是自由的一样,他们在服从法律的时候同样也是自由的。这样,从共和主义者的角度来看,自由的问题便转化为国家权力的归属问题。进一步说,共和主义首先认为国家中存在的强制是一部分人对另一部分人的强调而并非国家本身对于其公民的强制,因此,如果政权为公民全体所掌握,那么在这个国家中便实现了普遍的自由。
共和主义的传统强调公众意志、法律、以及自由之间的一致性,在把公民作为一个整体加以考察的时候,这种思想的优越性是明显的。但是,考虑到公民个人的自由的时候,这种思想不可避免地会遇到矛盾。由于在事实上法律几乎不可能是公民全体一致同意的产物,那么一位公民服从并不是他自己同意的法律的时候,他是否仍然自由呢?卢梭意识到了这个问题的存在,即在实际的政治中不可能始终保证任何的法律都得到公民全体一致的同意,在采取多数决定原则的情况下,必然出现最后通过的法律与部分公民的意志不一致的情况。卢梭认为,这种情况并不能改变对于公意的服从就是政治的自由这一基本的论断,对于那些持有与公意不同立场的人,国家有权力以强制的方式使他们接受公意的决定,也就是"强迫"他们"自由"。卢梭的推论是:法律应该作为"公意"的体现,而对于一个公民来说,无论他自己是否同意某一项体现了公意的具体的法律,他只有服从于它,自己才能实现真正的自由,也就是说,对于主权者和公意的服从实际上就是自由的体现。卢梭的理论实际上假设了一种公共理性与个人的理性的一致性;但他把"公意"等同于多数的意见又在相当的程度上忽视了个人意志的独立意义,从而被后人认为为某种极权主义的政治理论提供了依据。由此可见,在"共和主义"的传统之中,自由与强制的问题并没有能够得到真正的解决。康德虽然提出了理性的自律作为道德的自由的条件,自由被认为是服从于必然。但由于这种自律并不能仅仅等同于逻辑上的一致性,所谓的"必然"也缺乏相应的标准,所以在黑格尔的法哲学中,理性再次与国家意志等同起来。
十五世纪之后的西欧是绝对主义的国家发展的时期,从此开始,国家的权力得到了空前的发展,个人在这种全面强化的国家政权的面前表现出一种无力的感觉。因此,虽然1640年的英国革命之后,共和主义的传统在英国的革命者再次达到了高潮,但以共和主义的方式能否解决近代国家的条件下公民的自由与国家的强制之间的关系问题,对此不少思想家持一种怀疑的态度,而最明确地反映了这种怀疑的人就是霍布斯。霍布斯对于两次英国革命之间的战乱与动荡充满了恐惧,渴望有某种绝对的秩序来保证人们一些基本的自由与权利而不是理论上抽象的承诺。
霍布斯留给后人的印象是一位绝对君论的鼓吹者,但他对于近代自由主义思想的发展却发挥了一位类似于奠基人的作用,因为正是他明确提出政府的目的在于保护人类的某些基本的,人们在政府出现之前就已经享有的自由(自然权利),而在政府出现之后,自由就在于法律禁止之外的广泛的空间。他明确表示:"在主权者未以条令规定的地方,臣民都有自由根据自己的判断采取或不采取行动。" 这正是近代自由主义的两项基本的论题。当然,被自由主义者列为基本自由的人类的基本权利有一个逐步扩展的过程,它最早源于宗教改革运动中人们对于自由思想(对教义的理解的自由)。马丁·路德就曾经表示:"除非一切人为制定的法律(指教会法--引者)不论其内容如何都被干净彻底地加以废除,否则就根本没有解决问题的一丝希望。只有当我们拥有福音书给我们带来的自由,我们才能在一切方面依照它做出判断并指导我们的生活。"
由霍布斯所代表并由洛克真正加以发挥的对于自由的理解与"共和主义"的传统的区别是明显的。他们对于自由持一种绝对的理解,即自由就是不存在任何约束的状态,比如霍布斯就认为"自由简单地说就是不存在行为的障碍的一种状态。" 他们并且相信,在国家出现之前,由于不存在任何对个人的强制,每一个人都享有真正的自由。当然,自然界和他人会在某种意义上构成一种对个人的强制和约束,但这无论如何这不能被等同于政治上的不自由。人在国家出现之前享有基本的自由这样一种观念在后来以被概括为"天赋人权"的理论而被普遍接受下来。无论霍布斯还是洛克都相信,国家是人们为了保证他们自然地享有的这种自由与权利而建立起来的,国家的目的本身便决定了它合法行动的界限,这就是它不能反过来剥夺与危害这些自由。霍布斯和洛克那样的自由主义者都承认国家的存在及其活动必须以对人们原来无限的自由加以某些限制,也就是说,他们的政治观以国家与自由的绝对的对立为前提,这是他们与共和主义者的一个重大区别,即他们从不试图寻找某种能够把自由与强制统一起来的东西,而是明确承认强制就是对自由的剥夺。他们强调的是,国家对于个人自由的限制必须以对于基本的个人自由(基本人权)的保障作为界限,而在法律限制之外就是自由。不仅如此,人们既然是为了保证自己的自由才建立了国家,因此如果国家反过来严重威胁了他们的自由与权利,那么他们拥有完全正当的权利对国家进行反抗。
总之,自由主义对自由与法律的关系进行了全新的定义,在这里,法律成为一种纯粹的工具,它的使命就是对自由提供切实的保障。另外,自由与公民道德这一"共和主义"的传统话题也不再被提及。自由被直接诉诸人作为人的"自然权利。"正如斯宾诺莎所说:"我们必须把天然的状态看成是既无宗教也无法律的,因此也就没有罪恶与过失。……我们认为的自然状态是先于与缺乏神圣启示的法律与权利,并不只是因为无知,也是因为人人生来就赋有自由。"
应该看到,西方政治思想中对于自由的理解从法律所允许的就是自由到法律限制之外就是自由,这个转变使自由的范畴得到了极大的扩展。与共和主义者对于自由的理解相比,自由主义的理解的优越性是显而易见的,因为在某些情况下,多数并不能始终掌握真理,况且多数在现实的政治生活中也不可能真正掌握政治的决定权。在自由主义者看来,卢梭和黑格尔式的对于自由的理解不仅为"多数的暴政"提供了基础,而且也使某种政治力量借多数之名进行政治强制成为可能。从历史的发展来看,近代自由主义者把作为天赋人权的一个基本组成部分的自由视为全部法律与政治制度的出发点,个人的自由只以不妨碍他人同等的自由为限。近代自由西欧主义的产生是个人对于正在出现的专制国家的一种反抗,是个人面对一种强化之后的国家权力为确保公民的自由的一种反应。也就是说,当国家获得了一种前所未有的权力的同时,公民也在寻求一种能够与这种经过强化的国家权力相抗衡的个人自由的保障体系。这应该说是在专制国家时代自由观念的一种自然的表达,或者说,这种与古代自由观不同的自由观的出现具有其必然性。因此,近代自由主义所代表的自由观即是当时对于国家的性质、国家与社会的关系的独特的理解的结果,也是对于近代专制主义国家的一种反应。当然,也是个人自我意识逐步觉醒的最终结果。这样一种对自由的理解构成了现代国家全部政治法律制度的基础,这也从一个侧面表明了在近代国家的情况下人们追求政治上的自由的一种基本的选择。总的来说,由自由主义所确立的基本人权的观念,即个人具有某些国家无论如何也不能加以侵犯和剥夺的基本的自由的观念在西方政治思想中现在已经成为一种共识,成为任何政治讨论的基本前提。
但是,近代自由主义对于自由的理解也存在着一些难以克服的问题。自由主义者一方面相信人在没有国家的自然状态之下享有充分的自由,但另一方面又承认由于各种限制的存在,比如人们之间的相互争斗,这种自由往往成为不可能,甚至成为"一切人反对一切人的斗争",由此才有必要建立国家。从这个意义上说,国家虽然限制人的自由,但同时也保证人的自由。由于自然状态只不过是一种虚构--大多数的社会契约论者都承认这一点,那么自由从根本上来说仍然还是在国家之内而不是在国家之外,柏克正是在这个意义上以"英国人的自由"来批判法国大革命所提出的抽象的作为人的自由的观念。其次,虽然诸如生命与财产等基本权利作为"天赋的"自由得到确认,但比如说对于没有财产的人来说,这种自由就成为一种完全的抽象。至于一个人的自由是否真的能够在完全不妨碍其他人的自由的前提下得到完全的发挥,这本身也是一个没有经过严格论证的命题。正因此,虽然近代自由主义在各国反抗政治专制、争取公民的平等权利、扩展人们的政治自由方面的确发挥了巨大的作用,但是,这种在很大程度上忽视了具体的社会经济条件的自由常常也让人感到抽象而难以把握,这正是卢梭所说的:人生而自由,但无往而不在奴役之中。也正是萨特所集中揭示的人类自由的困境。
另一方面,由于近代自由主义的一个基本特点是它在很大程度上离开了对于道德以及对于人类社会共同体的关联,因此,它既可以表现为一种强者欺凌弱者的自由,也可能表现为一种那些拥有相应的社会资源的社会成员无限扩展自己的个人利益的自由。对于前者,梁启超曾经进行过精辟的评论,他对近代自由观念的解释就是:"前此唯在上位者乃为强者,今则在下位者亦为强者。……两强相遇,两权并行,因两强相消,两权平等,故可谓自由权与强权本同一物。" 对于后者,近代以来实际的社会政治生活也提供了充分的证明。一个典型的例子就是在科学的研究中是否应该保证绝对的自由,比如说,是否应该保证克隆人的自由?奥古斯丁曾经写道:"对于那种在欢呼自己的自由而不屑服务于上帝的灵魂来说,它将被剥夺原来所具有的那种对于其肉体的支配。由于它有意地抛弃了它之上的上帝,它也将失去在它之下的仆从,它实际上也不再能支配自己的行为,而如果它服从于上帝的话,它总是能够做到这一些的。" 这里说的是,自由本身需要某种内在的、道德的限度。
后现代主义的思想家们对于启蒙时代以来自由思想中包含的矛盾性进行了充分的批判。他们的批判在集中于两个方面,一是批判了近代自由主义思想的抽象性,即认为所谓的"自然权利"根本就是一种虚幻,福科就指出,根本就不存在"原始自由的空间",他明确表示:"我所关注的是这样的一个事实,即人类的所有关系在某种程度上都是一种权力关系。" 其次是批判了自启蒙运动以来西方思想传统中那种把理性、自我意识和自由完全等同的思维,断定这完全是一种错觉,而所谓的道德意识所真正反映的,不过是一种社会中的权力与控制关系在人的思维中的内在化。
福科在《道德的谱系学》一书中,对古代希腊罗马时代的伦理观念进行了一些有意思的反思。他认为,在古代希腊罗马文化中,伦理观念反映的是个体与其自身的关系,也就是说,它体现的是一种个人对于他自身的生活的把握,而教育的目的则是使人们更好地成为自己的主人。福科写道,尽管康德式的伦理学强调的是个体对于他人的责任和义务,但古代希腊罗马的伦理学强调的是对于自身欲望的把握与控制,与此同时,希腊和罗马人相信,能够完美地控制一个人的理性,同时也能够完美地控制整个城邦。可以说,福科是把古代希腊罗马文化作为一种现代文明的替代物而加以提倡的,他并且相信,这样一种文化可以克服现代化所带来的那种所谓的对人的内在化的强制,以及这种文化中所包含的以对人与自然的征与支配作为自由的前提的缺陷。福科希望能够实现一种个体的重构,这种新的个体将以经过提练的形式感受一种新的经验,愉悦与欲望。当然,福科也并不认为古代希腊罗马的伦理观念能够直接为现代人所用,用他的话来说:"在今天重新认识希腊人并不意味着必须把希腊的伦理观念视为我们必须参照的最高标准。关键在于欧洲的思想能够重新继续希腊人的思维,并且为了使人们得到完全的自由而重现这种经验。
福科认为:"古典时期失去的恰恰是一种对于自我作为主体的机制的问题意识……因此,某些问题如同当时对古代人一样,现在同样对我们提了出来。对于不同的人之间不同风格的追求,在我看来,正是古代不同群体的人就已经开始进行,而我们今天又再次追寻的目标。" 他并且指出,问题不在于单纯地"发现自己",发现个体内部的存在,而是在于一种不断的自我创造。福科表示,他自己的任务就是要寻找一种自由的空间,并使之产生一种使"我们能够人作为一种自足的主体"而存在的结构。 在福科看来,所谓的自由(Liberty)就是一种持续不断的道德实践,通过它个体实现了一种自我把握和自我关照。自由是"伦理的本体论条件",而伦理则是"自由借以实现的一种精细的形式。" 福科在不忽视自由的社会政治条件的同时,强调个体仍然具有一种进行自我界定、自我把握从而创造出一种自由的实践的能力,并且强调,正是这种能力的发挥,是个人冲破社会对于自由的限制的一种重要条件。福科对于自由问题的思考可以为我们理解中国传统思想中的自由观念提供某种可能的起点。
二、中国古代的自由观念 虽然中国古代对于自由这个概念也有所使用,比如说《孔雀东南飞》中就出现过"吾意久怀忿,汝岂得自由"的句子,从其含意看也具有类似西方语言中自由的内涵,但可以肯定的是,在近代以前的中国,这个概念并不具有作为人的一种道德与政治追求的意义,尤其是在正统的儒家思想中更是如此。但也并不能由此得出结论认为,在作为古代文化传统中不存在对个人自由的追求。焦仲卿的妻子作为一位普通妇女所向往的自由境界,体现的完全是一种任何人都可以具有的愿望。中国传统文化不可能不对这样的问题作出自己的回答。当然,事实上也做出了这种回答,但使用的完全是中国传统的思维范畴。
可以说,中国传统的自由观念是在春秋战国时期百家争鸣的过程中形成,并且最终在儒家文化的思想中形成了一种相对完整的思想体系。这种思想为特别是中国传统的士大夫阶层提供了一种具有相当的超越性的人生哲学和精神支柱。
对于中国传统文化观念的考察不可能不从提倡"克已复礼"的孔子说起。实际上,孔子生活的时代的社会政治环境与苏格拉底和柏拉图时期的古希腊相当类似,其基本的特征都是传统价值与习俗在社会政治生活中的支配作用急剧下降以及部分知识分子的自由思想的产生(用中国传统的说法就是"礼崩乐坏");而他们对于解决由此带来的社会动荡与文化和观念冲突所开的药方也非常相似,那就是柏拉图所提出的理念与孔子所提倡的"礼"。但是,两者又有所区别。首先,如上所述,柏拉图的理念论在政治学中的运用具有一种强烈的精英主义的色彩,也就是说,他相信对理念的把握只能是社会中极少数人的特权,他并且据此设计了一种高度等级化的社会政治模式;而孔子的"礼"论则不具有这种特点,因为"礼"是所有的人都能够通过学习而获得的,虽然说"礼不下庶人,刑不上大夫",但孔子还是强调"有教无类" 。由此决定了"礼"既是一种社会政治规范,同时也可以成为一种人格修养的准则,这就是"修齐治平"的根据所在。其次,"礼"论与理念论的另外一个重要的不同就在于"礼"作为一种仪式具有极强的实践性,它要求体现在每一个人日常起居的举手投足当中,甚至于要求"君子慎独"。"礼"的这种特点使它有可能成为一种能够为普通人仿效的生活方式(即福科所说的Style),并且成为符号化的生活观念的表达。与此相反,理念论作为一种通过语言表达的高度概念化的逻辑体系(logos),其抽象性使其在实践中只可能有一种社会控制的功能而不具备普遍化的人生哲学的实践能力。 正是由于"礼"具有上述两个方面的特点,所以虽然孔子穷其一生"知其不可而为之" ,以"克已复礼"为已任,但他的理论与实践的客观结果却不是把社会推回到遥远的过去(当然,柏拉图也没有能够做到这一点),而是为一种新的生活方式与人生哲学提供了一种独特的载体。在这里,手段替代了目的,"礼"的思想固然由于后世统治者的利用而成为约束人的自由的一种枷锁,但与此同时,也成为一种人通过自我修养而使其个性自由发展的起点。这就是"礼"论相对于理念论的优越性所在。因此,否认"礼"在中国历史上对于个性自由所造成的严重阻碍固然是一种不顾事实的观点,但在承认"礼"论的这种消极作用的同时,也应该看到,这种理论同时又为人的自由发展提供了某种可能的方向,或者说对自由提供了一种独特的理解。正是在这个意义上,美国的儒学研究者杜维明说:"东亚思想的显著特点体现在一个为世人普遍接受的命题上,即人可以在日常生活中通过自我努力而完善起来。"
儒家学说之所以提供了这样的一种可能性,关键就在于孔子在论"礼"的时候,提供的并不真的是一套严格的社会与政治的礼仪规范,而是一种全面的人格完善的培养方案。孔子关于人格完善的思想包括以下几个方面的主要内容。首先,他提倡一种积极进取的人生态度,虽然他也讲"天命",但他真正强调的是对于世人关注的富贵荣华的一种超然的态度,所以说 "生死有命,富贵在天。" 同时也是对于个人的成败得失的一种淡然处之的胸怀,故而有"道之将行也与?命也;道之将废也与?命也" 的说法。但这绝不意味着一种消极悲观的人生态度,否则就无法解释"天行健,君子以自强不息" 这种鼓舞了中国士人两千多年的进取精神。这种思想后来得到了孟子进一步的发挥,他表示,对于"理"或者说"道",人们"求则得之,舍则失之,是求有益于得也,求在我者也。求之有道,得之有命,是求无益于得也,求在外者也。"
其次,他相信一种人格普遍完善的可能性,孔子学说的一个主要特点是伦理色彩远远浓于认识论的色彩,长期困扰着西方哲学家的真理认识的可能性问题在孔子的学说中几乎不存在。如果说道德的真理也可以被称为真理的话,那么孔子显然是这个问题上的乐观主义者。他曾经自问自答道:"仁远乎哉?我欲仁,斯仁至矣。" 实际上,孔子的道德学说也不象康德的那样,把真理与道德分离开来。相反,孔子与苏格拉底类似,相信"知识就是美德","欲修其身者,先正其心;欲正其心者,先诚其意;欲诚其意者,先致其知。" 在知识的可能性问题上,儒家学说也指出过真知与谬见的差别,但这种差别不象西方传统哲学中真理与意见的区分那样截然对立。孟子说过:"均是人也,或从其大体,或从其小体,何也?"回答是:"耳目之官,不思而蔽于物。物交物,则引之而已矣。" 所以差别只在于是否能够或者说愿意去对事物进行感悟的差别,而不存在认识能力本身的不同。
第三,孔子的学说强调在人格修养上几乎是无限的可能性,即人可以入圣。这可以被认为是儒家学说相对于基督教哲学的一种优越性,因为它一方面与基督教一样强调人在自然与社会面前一种谦卑的态度,强调人的自我修养与完善,但与此同时,它对于人本身的价值又采取了一种积极而肯定的态度。所以有人评论道:"大师所注意的并不是一种关于人的抽象科学,而是囊括了心理学、伦理学和政治学的一种人生艺术。道德是个人努力的结果,而并不是贵族世家的固有品质。"
第四,与康德学说对于道德自律的强调不同,孔子的学说注重的是一种效法自然、天人合一的态度。这种态度寻求天地人之间一种内在的和谐与统一。《左传》中就提到:"夫礼,天之经也,地之义也,民之行也。" 孔子也认为,君子正确的人生态度应该是"刚健而文明,应乎天而顺乎人。" 而其理想的状态,就是"从心所欲,不愈矩。" 孟子进一步发挥了这种思想,从而提出了他关于"尽心"、"知性"、"事天"的理论,即"尽其心者,知其性也。知其性,则知天矣。存其心,养其性,所以事天也。" 尽心知命即可以知天事天,以至"万物皆备于我矣。反身而诚,乐莫大焉。" 孟子对"诚"的概念还进行了一下解释:"诚者,天之道也;思诚者,人之道也。" 后来的朱熹对于"理"和"性"的关系进行了一个十分简洁的解释:朱熹说:"性者,即天理也。天物禀而受之,无一理不具。" 这说明,天与人之间存在着一种内在的逻辑上甚至是结构上的一致性。孟子说:"夫君子所过者化,所存者神,上下与天地同流,岂曰小补之哉?"
这种观念被南宋的张载正式概括为"天人合一"的说法,他解释道:"儒者则因明致诚,因诚致明,故天人合一,致学而可以成圣,得天而未使遗人。" 又说,"天人异用,不足以言诚;天人异知,不足以尽明。所谓诚明者,性与天道不见乎小大之别也。" 程颢与程颐则提出了一种天人一体的理论,认为,"人之所以为人者,以有在理也。" "天人本无二,不必言合。" 程颢还进一步认为"仁者,浑然与物同体。" "圣人之神,与天为一。" 王守仁这位被称为中国哲学史上主观唯心主义代表人物的思想家则说:"心即道,道即天,知心则知道知天。" 宋明理学对于《礼记·礼运》中所谓的"人者,天地之心也"一句话进行了发挥,张载就表示这说明人"为天地立心"。王守仁也说:"夫人者,天地之心,天地万物本吾一体者也。" 冯友兰解释说,"'为天地立心',就是把人的思维能力发展到最高的限度,天地间的事物和规律得到最多和最高的理解。" 可以看出,这些学者所试图做的,是对儒学的道德思想提供一种彻底的认识论的解释。这种由认识人生而认识宇宙,再返回到人生的认识论与伦理观相统一的思想,是中国传统思想的一个重要特征。
第五,与道德上的相对主义不同,孔子推崇一种道德理想高于一切的精神,所以说"仁人志士,无求生以害仁,有杀身以成仁。" 这里的"仁"既可以理解为一种道德理想,但也不妨理解为一种道德化的社会正义观念。孟子一段非常有名的话是:"生,亦我所欲也;义,亦我所欲也。二者不可得兼,舍生而取义者也。生亦我所欲也,所欲有甚于生者,故不为苟得也;死亦我所恶,所恶有甚于死者,故患有所不辟也。" 这种舍生取义的精神成为中国古代圣贤的精神支柱,它在中国历史上既表现为对专制政治的反抗,也表现为对民族大义的捍卫,最近的例子,可能就是戊戌变法中六君子的态度。
最后,孔子的伦理学说虽然表现出一种以个人的人格修养为中心的特点,但其最终的立足点仍然是对社会、对民众的一种关注,甚至可以说是一种关爱。这就是所谓的"士不可以不弘毅,任重而道远。仁以为已任,不亦重乎?死而后已,不亦远乎?" "仁"的观念相一致,这种关注或者说关爱形成了中国古代知识分子一种崇高的人生理想。孔子对于君子的定义之一就是"可以托六尺之孤,可以寄百里之命,临大节而不可夺也。君子人欤?君子人也。"
孔子学说以上的几个方面得到后来的一些儒学者的发扬,孟子特别发挥了孔子思想中强调个人的自我修养、自强不息的一面,他认为,"人之导异于禽兽者几希,庶民去之,君子存之。" "求则得之,舍则失之……,求在我者也。" "舜何人也,余何人也,有为者亦若是。" 这个命题被引申为"人皆可为尧舜" 的信念,并形成了他独特的"养气"的学说的核心。南宋的周敦颐对此提供了进一步的解释,说:"圣可学乎?曰可。曰有要乎?曰有。请闻焉。曰一为要。一者无欲也。无欲则静虚、动直。静虚则明,明则通;动直则公,公则溥。明通公溥,庶矣乎!"
与孔子相比,孟子更强调主体一种自由负责的精神,他甚至明确表示,"仁之于父子也,义之于君臣也,礼之于宾主也,智之于贤者也,圣人之于天道也,命也,有性焉,君子不谓命也。" 这种思想在某种意义上与萨特自由选择的理论相类似,但并没有萨特那种悲观主义的色彩。孟子对于君子风范的表述是:"居天下之广居,立天下之正位,行天下之大道,得志,与民由之;不得志,独行其道。富贵不能淫,贫贱不能移,威武不能屈,此之谓大丈夫。" 孟子从他的人格修养的理论出发,甚至认为,人生活中的痛苦与磨练,都是为实现个人人格完善的一种手段。他的一句大概能够被以往所有读过书的中国人背诵的话是:"故天将降大任于斯人也,心先苦其心志,劳其筋骨,饿其体肤,空乏其身,行拂乱其所为,所以动心忍性,曾益其所不能。"
荀子则强调了所谓的"义"或者是"礼"的客观性。在他看来,"义"和"礼"远不是某一位立法者的武断之作,它们被构想得如同是客观的现实而不是伦理品德。它们是历史的自然产物,因而归并成了一种合理性的本原,社会本身就是任何理之原。社会秩序和理的结合点就在于此。 也就是说"天有其时,地有其财,人有其治,夫是之谓能参。"
此外,儒家学说也得到了中国历史上其他的思想传统,特别是道家思想的补充。道家思想的核心,可以被概括为一种"泛自然"的观念,即一种把宇宙与人世都统一于自然的思维倾向。这种思想类似于卢梭,即认为文明的发展本身是人对于自身的自然本性的一种偏离,从而文明的进步从人的本性来说不过是一种退化。因此,在道家思想,特别是庄子看来,人类要实现真正的自由,一个根本的条件就是去除一切文明的"污染",完全依从并且发挥人的自然本性。庄子称这种自然本性为"德"。庄子说: "泰初有无。无有无名,一之所起。有一而末形。物得以生,谓之德。" 庄子并且把自然与人为放在了两个对立的极端,他用比喻的方式指出:"天在内,人在外。……牛马四足,是谓天。落马首,穿牛鼻,是谓人。" 庄子强调,顺从自然,人就能得到真正的幸福,也就是自由,相反,如果以人的意志强行改变自然,那么其结果只会是人为自己强加了一种人为的枷锁,也就是说:"凫胫虽短,续之则忧。鹤胫虽长,断之则悲。故性长非所断,性短非所续,无所去忧也。"
道家这种效法自然的思想对儒家学说提供了一种重要的补充。一方面,虽然儒道两家对于"道"有一些不同的看法,但是,道家思想中效法自然的观念为儒学者们对于"天理"、"性"等难以把握的概念的理解提供了一种重要的参照,实际上,早在《中庸》中就表现出一种类似于老庄哲学中"大道无形"、"取法自然"的观念。《中庸》中说:"故至诚无息,无息则久,久则敛,敛则悠远,悠远则博厚,博厚则高明。博厚所以载物也,高明所以覆物也,悠久所以成物也。博厚配地,高明配天。" 所谓的厚德载物,也就是这个意思。后来东汉时期的王弼对于"圣人"这个儒家思想的传统概念的说明也渗透了道家思想中顺从自然,无为而治的观念:"故圣人达自然之性,畅万物之情,故因而不为,顺而不施。" 此外,虽然儒家思想基本上以积极进取为特征,但"自然"、"清静"、"无为"的思想也一直与儒学的正统理论相生相伴,为中国古代知识分子提供了一种自我观照的重要参照坐标。当我们在欣赏陶潜下面的这样的诗作的时候,我们不可能不感觉到这就是一种对自由的赞美:
结庐在人境,而无车马喧。 问君何能尔,心远地自偏。 采菊东篱下,悠然见南山。 山气日夕佳,飞鸟相与还。 结庐在人境,而无车马喧。
冯友兰说,这是一种自动远离约束的自由观。尤其是当文人失意、"退而独善其身"的时候,这种观念为他们寄情于自然,明心见性开辟了一种无限的可能性。这一点只要从"竹林七贤"的生活与思想中就可以明显地看出来,他们的狂放与自由由阮籍的一句诗表现得非常充分:"谁言万事难,逍遥可终生。" 不能仅仅把这种现象视为一种失意的知识分子的自我安慰。总而言之,"儒法互补"是中国传统的士大夫文化的一个典型特征。
正是因为具有以上的特点,所以人们普遍认为,儒家思想具有强烈的人文主义的色彩。林语堂曾经对儒家文化的精神加以概括,并且认为,中国传统的"人文主义的发端,在于明理。所谓明理,非仅指理智理论之理,乃情理之理,以情之理相调和。" 具体来说,这种人文主义的精神表现在一种以人为中心的思想,荀况说:"水火有气而无生,草木有生而无知,禽兽有知而无义。人有气、有生、有知且亦有义,故最为天下贵也。" 董仲舒也认为;"人下长万物,上参天地",所以"最为天下贵"。 同时,也包含了一种人可以参悟人生与宇宙的规律即"理"或者说"道"的乐观主义精神。最后,正如下文还要强调的,它强调的是一种通过人与自然的协调实现人的自由的理想。
也正是从这些特点出发,我们断定儒家传统中包含有一种独特的关于个人自由的理想,那就是通过对于道德以及自然规律的领悟,通过个人与自然和社会的协调,为个人开拓出无限的自由的空间。需要指出的是,虽然儒家思想强调个人对于自然与社会规律的协调,但也并不一味主张顺从现存的自然或者社会秩序,"君子"言行的依据是所谓的"道",所以从本源上说,儒家思想仍然具有一种反抗的精神。
三、中西方自由观念的互补性
对于中国与西方政治思想的比较是一件非常艰难的工作,因为这两种思想体系都同样的源远流长,博大精深,而且每一种体系内部都包含了诸多各不相同的、甚至是相互矛盾的内容。从某种意义上说,是否能把它们各自作为一种整体加以看待都是一个需要加以证明的问题。因此,任何一种简单的比较都不可避免地会具有片面性,而且也不可避免地会对其中的某一方面甚至两方面都作出一些不公正的判断。我们正是在承认这所有的局限性的前提下试图得出以下一些尝试性的结论。
首先可以看到的是,在西方政治思想的发展过程中,关于自由的理解体现出明显的阶段性,而且人们对自由的理解在不同的阶段具有明显不同的内涵。如果不把古代希腊的自由观念当作一个独立的发展阶段的话,那么可以说共和主义传统与近代自由主义分别对自由提供了两种非常不同的可能的理解方式。前者注重的是自由与法律(这是古希腊罗马民主制时期的政治观念的继续,即是一种以公民能够参与法律的制定为前提的对于自由的理解),以及自由与理性(这是近代民族国家产生之后,直接民主已经成为一种难以企及的理想的情况下对于自由的一种界定)的同一性。这种同一性进一步加以分析的话,可以被理解为一种道德主体的自我同一性,只不过前者是直接的,不经过任何中介的,而后者则需要以理性为媒介物。
共和主义传统对于自由的理解从正面来说是强调自由与法律和理性的统一,而从反面来说就是强调自由的适当限度,强调自由与放任的区别。由于在任何社会条件下个人的自由都要受到他人或者社会客观条件的制约,而不论人们是否愿意承认这一点,所以共和主义传统的自由观有其真理性的一面。但是,这种理解也有其内在的局限性和矛盾。因为首先,法律作为公民集体的意志在实践中多数情况下只能被视为一种假设,每个公民并不可能在任何事情上为自己立法并与他的同胞相一致,法律作为一个整体更多地是表现为一种历史的积淀,在最好的情况下也只能表现为一种在特定时期少数对多数的服从的结果。所以正如上面已经提到的,就每一位公民所服从的法律是否是他自己的意志的体现的问题上,共和主义的传统很难作出令人满意的回答。从卢梭起,思想家们把法律替换为"公意"或者"理性",强调个人意志、理性与自由的同一性,实际上强调的是只有与理性相一致的自由才是一种真正的自由。抽象地看,这是一个似真的表述,但一旦考虑到理性的判断是否能够被带进政治领域,这种表述所存在的问题马上就暴露了出来。卢梭把"公意"等同于多数决定的逻辑早已受到自由主义者的批判,因为一个简单的事实是真理或者理性并不必然地掌握在政治上的多数的手里,因此即使自由在于对理性的服从,结论也并不必然地意味着自由是对多数的服从。因为在这里暗含了"多数的暴政"的可能性。至于把理性等同于国家意志或者国家利益的黑格尔式的观念,则专制的色彩就更为明显,因为在这种情况下,理性甚至可能成为少数人的意志或者利益的一种伪装。
共和主义传统对于自由的理解正是由于具有如上所述的缺陷,所以特别是在国家权力得到全面强化的近代民族国家产生的时期就显得特别的无力。因为它在客观上成为一种对个人自由的限制,而对于国家的行为却不能提供任何制度上的约束。这种缺陷的存在是共和主义传统的自由观念终于在近代让位于自由主义对自由的理解的一个关键性的原因。自由主义一般通过自然权利的观念,把生命、财产、思想、言论等方面的自由绝对化,并使之成为近代国家与法律制度的基础。虽然自然权利与自然法的理论只是一种纯粹的假设,但它终于在西方得到一种普遍的承认,这表明自由主义对于个人自由的理解一方面在近代民族国家的新的政治环境中能够为个人自由提供一种基本的保障;同时也说明这些被称为"自然权利"的个人自由在近代社会已经逐步地被人们视为一种人的基本条件,换言之,也可以说它从政治自由的侧面表明了在近现代人类文明发展的水平上人们对于人的基本规定性的一种普遍化的理解,是社会进步的一种体现。也可以说,自由主义者们所捍卫的那些基本自由已经能够为现代社会的基本政治条件所接受,也就是说,自由的边界已经外推到这些基本自由之外了。
自由主义的自由观念第一次为人类的个人自由提供了一种真正明确的界说,在理论上与法律上使对那些基本自由的保障成为国家和社会存在的根本目的,同时也使自由成为每一位公民都能够平等享有的权利而不论其身份、教育与财富方面的任何差异。这是自由主义相对于共和主义传统的优越性,也是它能够在近代世界极大地推进人类自由事业的根本原因。但在另一方面,自由主义的传统也存在一些难以克服的困难与矛盾。首先,这种对于自由的理解具有相当的抽象性,也就是说,它所保证的在实际上只是一种自由的可能而不是真实的自由,对于那些由于出身或者其他的偶然因素决定不具有或者较少具有自由的条件的人来说,这种自由实际上就失去了或者在相当的程度上失去了意义。由于早期自由主义强调对于国家行为的限制,这个问题就显得尤其严重。虽然从功利主义开始的自由主义者注意到了社会对于个人实现其基本自由提供一些必要条件的责任,但正由于罗尔斯所批评的,由于功利主义论证的着眼点在于社会功利的最大化,这样的自由主义仍然缺少一种个性化的标准。
其次,自由主义是以个人主义的形式体现出来的,所以它对个人自由只承认一些最低限度的限制,即不损害别人同等的自由。这种观念对于自由的社会乃至自然条件的忽视是明显的,这一点在洛克的理论中可以清楚地看出来。另外,自由主义的观念也放弃了对于自由主体的道德性要求,洛克的方法是让宗教来完成这方面的任务,而主流的自由主义则是通过把政治与道德进行分离而回避了这个难题。自由主义在这些方面的特征表现为对共和主义传统的一种全面的反动,也是它受到来自社会主义以及自由主义本身以外的其他思想流派批判的一个重要原因。
与西方相比,我们可以看到,中国传统的自由观念表现出与共和主义传统的某些相似之处--比如说强调自由与理性(中国传统观念中的"天理"或者"道"、"性")、强调自由内在的约束性,等等。当然,这样一种特点同时也就决定了中国传统思想具有与共和主义传统同样的缺陷,即可能因为对于"理"和"性"的过分强调而压制了个人的自由与个性的发展,特别是宋代以后,由于理学的影响,当然更重要的是由于政治统治变得越来越专制,"天理"与"人欲"被完全置于一种对立的地位,"理"在很大程度上成为一种通过把政治秩序内在化而压制个人自由的工具,而这也正是五四以后不少人,比如说鲁迅把整个中国的历史称为礼教杀人的历史的主要原因。这就可能使通过"礼"所理解的自由表现出一种似是而非的特点,比如说,梁漱溟就认为,"中国人恰恰介于自由不自由之间--他未尝自由,亦未尝不自由。" 至于近代西方的自由主义思想,在中国几乎是完全缺乏的。所以在不断强化的专制主义国家的面前,个人实际上没有任何切实的保护自己的自由与权利的手段。
这个问题还可以进一步进行稍微深入的讨论。古代中国是一个低度分化的社会,而作为中国传统文化的一个重要特点,就是社会与政治的同一性。在传统中国,"礼"具有西方法律所发挥的相当大的一部分功能,它既是一种社会道德规范,同时也是一种政治规范。在西方传统思想中,由于始终把自由与政治、法律加以联系进行界定,所以虽然共和主义的传统强调自由在于对法律的服从,但从严格的意义上来讲,法律在这种传统中只是被视为一种制度性的中介,自由的主体通过法律的中介而实现了与自身的内在同一;其次,法律本身所具有的平等的性质也使它有可能被发展为一种对自由进行保障的重要工具,这种可能性在自由主义思想中变成了现实。与之相反,在中国的思想传统中,"礼"并不具有一种类似西方的法律的中介作用,它更多强调的是对个人的约束与提升,所以也有可能使个人自由始终处于一种受到压抑的状态,另外,"礼"本身所具有的等级性和相对的不确定性也使它不可能在实践中成为约束政府权力的有效工具。这些都是中国传统观念中在自由问题上的一些内在缺陷。
但在另一方面,与西方的自由观念相比,中国的传统观念也具有一些独特的优越性。它表现在以下几个方面。首先,由于中国传统思想中对于自由的理解从一开始就注重个人人格发展中对于"礼"、"道"与"天理"的同一,所以它从根本上就排除了把自由理解为放任的可能性,而是强调一种个人的自由发展与社会和自然的协调一致,从而能够避免极端的个人主义与在西方文化传统中越来越明显的人与自然的矛盾与冲突。不能说中国传统思想忽略了这种冲突的存在,荀子早就指出:"欲恶同物,欲多而物寡,寡则必争矣。" 但中国人找到了某种独特的协调这种冲突的方式。正如林语堂所说,中国传统的"这种人文精神虽然不能演出西方式的法治制度,在另一方面却产生出一种比较和平容忍的文化。在这种文化之下,个性发展比较自由,而西方式的文化的硬性发展与武力侵略,比较受中和的道理所抑制。"
其次,中国传统思想强调个人通过自我修养而获得的一种无限完善的可能性,而且由于这种人格的完善主要通过对自然与社会的客观规律的领悟并据此进行自我调整来实现,所以可以在相当大的程度上克服西方的自由主义对个人自由的理解在自然与社会资源客观上存在有限性的人类社会中所必然带来的个人与社会、与自然的冲突的问题。
第三,中国传统的对于自由的理解中对于自然的依重同时为处理人与人、人与自然的关系提供了一种可取的思路。与西方思想不同,在中国的传统观念中,自然不是作为人类社会的对立物出现的,它不是人类征服的对象,而是人类灵感与思维的源泉,是人的思想与行为的依据,是人陶冶情操的场所,也是人通过实现与其高度的一致而实现自我娱悦,从而也是实现某种形式的个人自由的可以与之协调共存侣伴。中国传统思想把人类社会作为整个宇宙大系统的一个有机组成部分,强调它们之间内在的一致性,从而在另一个方面解决了自由主义所带来的问题。严复在翻译密尔的《自由论》(严译为《群已权界论》)时曾经对于自由进行过如下的理解:"自由者,凡所欲为,理无不可。此如有人独居世外,其自由界域,岂有限制?为善为恶,一切皆自本身起义,谁复禁之?但自入人群而后,我自由者人亦自由,使无限制约束,便入强权世界,而相冲突。故曰:人得自由,而必以他人之自由为界。此则《大学》絮矩之道,君子所恃以平天下者也。" 严复用中国的传统思想对于西方的自由观念进行的理解当然是不正确的,但如果把这种理解视为对中国人从自身的传统文化出发对自由这一概念所进行的诠释,倒也可以给人们提供某些启发。
最后,通过"礼"对于自由的理解与西方强调自由与理性的统一有所不同,"礼"作为一种可以加以模仿的生活方式,可以在很大程度上克服理性所具有的抽象性,从而使自由可以成为一种高度个性化的生活方式。李泽厚认为,孔子最大的贡献是把一种外在的"礼"内在化为一种主体的内在自觉,使其更接近于现实中的人生感受、情感体验与生活的常识。 李泽厚并且认为,孔子现实的这一转变使"礼乐"不再具有原来的神秘性,并且使"修身"成为个体成员也可以承担的历史责任或至上义务,从而大大地提高了个体人格,提高了它的主动性、独立性和历史责任性。
总的来说,如果我们把自由理解为人类思想或者行为不受外部限制的状态,那么自由的获得就将取决于两个方面的条件:外部障碍的消除或者自由的主体自身行为能力的增强。在人类对自由的追求过程中,如果说西方的传统注重的是前者,那么可以说中国的传统强调的则是后者。因此可以认为,西方与中国传统的自由观之间可能存在着某种互补性,对于中国人来说,接受特别是自由主义传统对于自由的理解是使我们的自由能够具有真正的保障的一个重要前提,而中国传统对于自由的理解则可能为人类对于自由的追求提供一种协调的、无限发展的可能性。 |
If freedom is defined in its most general sense as a state of absence of any obstacle to human thoughts and actions, then no nation in the world would reject this kind of freedom at any time, thought they may understand and pursue freedom in different ways. The term "freedom" as is used here carries strong Western connotations, which to some extent obliterates the special characteristics necessarily possessed by other cultural traditions. As far as China is concerned, in the modern era, the fight against "autocracy" by means of Western "freedom" has been a topic lasting for more than one hundred years. The topic continues to last, indicating the vitality of this demand. But this is only half the story. If we believe this basic proposition that the pursuit of freedom is the only driving force behind the progress of human society, we have to admit that if there has been no persist pursuit for freedom in the cultural tradition of China, there would be no existence and the development of Chinese culture over the past thousands of years.
If we admit that, in Chinese traditional culture, there is a concept somewhat analogous to the Western notion of freedom, then we are not only confronted with the problem of language transit, that is, the equivalent switching of a series of concepts and contexts between Chinese and Western cultural systems when reflections are conducted concerning the notion of "freedom". More importantly, we are also confronted with the task of discovering the relative values of those two concepts of freedom and their inadequacies by contrasting, under the specific contexts of dialogue, the historical development of the concept of freedom in China and in the West. In this way, we can provide possible new clues for an understanding, at once more general and specific, of the concept of freedom.
Part I: The Concept of Freedom in the Western Tradition
The ancient Greek culture is the origin of Western political thought. Many political thinkers trace the concept of freedom as developed in the modern period in the West back to ancient Greece and indicate that, from the outset, Western civilization contained the earliest notion of freedom. In political thought, this is called the myth of "great historical tradition". However, an actual examination of the ancient Greek political thought would indicate that, though we cannot say that ancient Greeks had not idea of freedom, their understanding of freedom differed considerably from the notion of freedom developed in Western modern history. As a matter of fact, the Western concept of freedom in the modern period was the product of its modern political and social development. Or we can say that the modern expression of freedom is the ultimate product of Western political thought after a series of shifts in the reflections on freedom since the ancient Greece.
Among the Greeks of the Homer period, it is difficult to find a positive feeling and experience of freedom. Prometheus reiterates the price for pursuing freedom and Sisyphus explains to the populace the impossibility to fight against one's fate. The story of Oedipus Rex typically embodies the despair of ancient Greeks in their quest for freedom. In ancient Greek literature, the earliest articulation of freedom is made by Hesiod in one of poems, in which the eagle says to his prey " Why do you shiver so?/ You have been captured by a more powerful predator/ You can only travel around with me/ If I am willing, you could be my meal/Or I can set you free/ Only the stupid will rebel."(1)
This is the most general understanding of freedom, as a state opposite to enslavement. Of course, to some extent, freedom can be understood only in this way. Because of the institution of slavery in all the city-states in ancient Greece and because of the different political system within those city-states, the contrast between the slaves and the free people and the contrast in the mode of civic life between different city-states naturally served as a foundation on which people understood the concept of freedom. However, the freedom understood in this way by the ancient Greeks might be more properly considered to be a right. Among ancient Greek political thinkers, Aristotle made many references to the concept of freedom. For example, when referring to the distinction between oligarchy and democracy, he wrote: "if within a city-state all people are free citizens, rich people would only account for a small proportion. Some are marked by freedom while others are marked by their property. Those are the actual foundations on which those representing oligarchy and those representing democracy struggle for the power of government."(2) When talking about the necessary conditions for the city-states to obtain excellent political life, he says: " Apart from wealth and freedom, the quality of justice and the quality of a soldier (bravery) are also indispensable. If people are to co-exist in a city-state, they should possess those qualities. The first two qualities are necessary for the existence of the city-state while the later two qualities are the conditions that a city-state should attempt to pursue and with which it can obtain excellent life."(3) Aristotle further believes that "if political justice could be realized in a city-state, among people who co-exist for the purpose of attaining self-sufficiency, they will find they are free, equal in proportion, or in mathematical terms." (4)
There should be no doubt that Aristotle used the concept of freedom to indicate the possession of certain political rights. Actually, in ancient Greece, the great difference between free people and slaves lies in whether a person possessed the right to participate in the political life of the city-state. Of course, besides Aristotle's understanding, there was another type of understanding of freedom prevalent in ancient Greece, which was represented by Pericles. In his famous Address at a Funeral, he proposes: " Our political freedom has spread to our daily life. ……. But all those in our personal life have not made us indifferent to law as citizens. Our guarantee lies in a belief, which constantly reminds us of the need to obey our administrators and the law, ……. In Athens, we live according to what we like but we are always ready to meet all challenges. Although our habits derive from leisure instead of labor and our courage is natural rather than artificial, we are willing to face hazards. We do not have to undergo those unnecessary hardships but we are ready to face those hardships fearlessly when it is necessary. Therefore, compared with those who have never been out of hardships, we possess double advantages."
Nevertheless, it is not proper to idealize Pericles' glorification of Athenian freedom because both the Athenians and the Spartans owed the obligation of absolute obeying the city-states to which they belonged. The freedom that they could enjoy was within the limits granted by their city-states. The point is that any citizen had no right to rebel against the unfair and the unjust actions of the city-states. The death of Socrates serves as a typical example in this respect. This is the greatest difference between the ancient and the modern forms of freedom. The death of Socrates and the rapid decline of the Athenian city-states after Pericles made Plato extremely skeptical about the Athenian freedom and the democratic form that embodied this freedom. He believed that a genuine form of politics does not require the free choice of individuality because the objective existence of thee weaknesses of humanity necessarily turns this kind of freedom into an indulgence in personal desires. For Plato, what is fundamental to politics is a kind of definite order, that is, justice or the absolute domination of reason over the "wishes" and the desires. This domination can be manifest in the same person or in a city-state, that is, the government of the public life by a philosopher.
If we reconstruct Plato's thoughts by means of the later-day concept of freedom, a question might be raised: what should be the relationship between truth and freedom? Although Plato himself did not provide any definite expression of such thoughts, we can still ask whether, according to Plato's ideology, the person who lived by the principle of reason and completely controlled his personal desires is free. We know that Plato would give an affirmative answer to this question. Here, an initial foundation was provided for a later-day discussion concerning the relationship between freedom and inevitability. However, this type of freedom is not in accordance with human nature, as is pointed out by Aristotle in his critique. On the other hand, it is overly tinted with elitism because according to Plato's theory only a very limited number of people could live by the principle of reason. In the actual political life, what Plato wished was surely to guarantee a sort of freedom of thought for such thinkers as Socrates. But the contradiction is that although he reserved for philosophers the status of the highest ruler in his republic, he has also eliminated any possibility of free thinking because what he conceived was a mode of public life that was totally static, rigid, which he regarded as perfect (or is there any room for improvement in his republic?). It is therefore natural that Socrates did not have a good time there.
To a large extent, the ideas which were proposed by Plato in his Republic were later rejected by himself. Aristotle's understanding of freedom came back to the level of common sense. Aristotle once said that a good life under constitution is a life of safety rather than a life of enslavement. This idea was inherited by Thomas Aquinas, who further believed that such a life was both "libertatern and salutem". This idea constituted the basic content of the concept of freedom during the period from ancient Rome to Middle Ages. As is mentioned above, like ancient Greeks, the initial Roman conception of freedom is the kind of freedom that Romans enjoyed in comparison with the slaves and other races outside Rome. Freedom was also incorporated as some political and social rights. But apart from that people in ancient Rome developed some kind of new understanding concerning freedom, that is, the understanding of freedom in the so-called "republicanist" tradition. Such an understanding includes the following two aspects. There is the relationship between law and freedom. Political thinkers in ancient Rome, like Cicero, all emphasized that freedom should be regulated by law in order for people to differentiate freedom from "license". Cicero himself wrote that "Anything that goes to the extreme will be its opposite, whether it is the climate, the income, or the health of man. It is especially true for the political life of a nation. Extreme freedom would result in extreme enslavement. This is equally applicable to the general public as a whole and to the individual citizens. Complete freedom would lead to political tyranny, which is the most unjust and most cruel state of enslavement."(5)
The "republicanist" tradition stresses the subordination of freedom to law. But the law is not the arbitrary law. Cicero pointed out that "freedom can find its proper place only when the public has commanded the supreme power of the state."(6) That is to say, a basic condition for freedom is that the general public as a whole can become the framers of law. This is where the essential spirit of "republicanism" dwells. Augustine also believed that the pursuit of freedom and honor made Roman people create admirable achievements(7).In addition, the "republicanist" tradition stresses the role of the natural law and stressed the ultimate agreement between the law in reality and the natural law. This is the second guarantee for the freedom of the citizens in the "republicanist" tradition. Because political thinkers from Cicero to Aquinas all emphasized the inner cohesion between natural law and reason, it is easy to come to the conclusion that freedom is subordinated to law and hence to reason.
The second peak in the development of the "republicanist" thought happened in the Renaissance Italy. Since the beginning of the 14th century, the relationship between the political system and freedom had become one of the important issues that aroused the concern of the Italian humanists. The republic of Florence at that time served as the typical example for their study. One of the early humanists Coluccio Salutati wrote in a letter in 1369 that there was nothing nobler, greater and more valuable than freedom. Freedom was a "dulce libertatisfrenum", which implies a life under the law, a law that governs all people and is established according to the most fair principle of equality. Leonardo Bruni further elaborated on Cicero's ideas by pointing out that the Florentine system made it possible to establish definite legal norms for people's political life, a fact which constituted the strengths of the Florentine system. Different political forces within the state achieved proper balance, which, fundamentally speaking, provided a legal guarantee for freedom. He alleged that there would be no republic if there was no law and that life would be meaningless without freedom(8). Another humanist Alamano clearly asserts in his 1479 dialogue On Liberty that "political freedom dwells in the possibility of a free life within the confines of law and mores". At the same time, he believes that a sensible man can bring his passion under the control of reason and realize the possibility of freedom. By contrast, an insensible person would be dominated by his passion and turn his freedom into endless dissatisfaction and misfortune(9). Dante also believes that a man is free if he lives by the principle of reason. On the contrary, if he allows himself to be dominated by his desires or the will of others, he will be cast into an enslaved state. A corrupt political system would reduce people into mere slaves while a just system could help people develop into citizens of virtue and integrity.
Generally speaking, the republicanists uses the law formulated by the citizens as an intermediary to unify freedom and imposition. According to their view, if the law of the state is framed by the people of the state and if such a law is the reflection of their common will, then the compliance with the law would naturally become the result of their voluntary choice. This is because under such circumstances, they are not obeying others but obeying themselves. Therefore, just as they are free when they formulated their constitution, they are also free when they are obeying the law. In this way, from the perspective of the republicanists, the issue of freedom is transformed into the problem of the jurisdiction of the state power. To put it in another way, the republicanists first of all believe that the imposition inherent in the state is the imposition by a group of people over another group of people, not the imposition by the state over its citizens. Therefore, if the political power is controlled by all citizens, then the state can be said to have achieved universal freedom.
The republicanist tradition emphasizes the conformity between public will, law and freedom and its superiority is quite obvious when all the citizens are examined as a whole. But when the individual freedom of the citizens is taken into account, this type of thought will inevitably encounter its paradoxes. Because in fact it is virtually important that the law is a product of universal agreement, we may well ask whether the person who has to obey the law that he himself does not agree with is free? Rousseau was clearly aware of the problem that in actual politics it cannot be guaranteed that every law can win the universal support from the citizens. If the principle of majority vote is adopted, it is inevitable that the law as is finally passed does not conform to the will of a proportion of citizens. Rousseau believes that this should not change the basic proposition that the compliance of public opinion is the political freedom. As for those people who hold a different position from the public opinion, the state has the right to force them, by means of imposition, to accept the decisions by the public opinion, that is, to force "freedom" on them. Rousseau's inference is that the law should be the incarnation of the "public will" and, for individual citizens, whether or not he agrees with a particular law (which is the incarnation of the "public will"), he has to comply with it in order to achieve his true freedom. In other words, the compliance with the public will is actually a reflection of freedom. Rousseau's theory in fact hypothesizes an agreement between the public reason and the individual reason. But his practice of identifying the "public will" with the majority opinion has considerably neglected the independent significance of the individual will, which, in the view of later thinkers, provided a basis for a totalitarian political theory. It is obvious that in the "republicanist" tradition, the problematic relationship between freedom and imposition was not really worked out. Although Kant proposed the self-discipline of reason as the condition for moral freedom, freedom was still required to comply with the inevitable. However, since this self-discipline cannot be simply equated with the logical uniformity, the so-called "necessity" lacks corresponding criteria. Thus in Hegel's juristic philosophy, reason was once again identified with the will of the state.
In Western Europe after the 15th century there was a period of active development for the absolutist states. From that time on, the power of the state experienced unprecedented growth and in the face of the completely strengthened state power, the individual could only feel a sense of helplessness. Therefore, even though the republicanist tradition reached another peak among the English revolutionaries after the 1640 English Revolution, many philosophers remained skeptical whether the republicanist mode could possibly work out the relationship between the liberty of citizens and the imposition of the state under the condition of modern states. It was Hobbes who gave the fullest articulation of this skepticism. Hobbes had a deep fear of the wars and the turmoil that happened between the English revolutions. He wished that there could be some absolute order which could assure people that certain of the basic human liberties and rights would not remain mere abstract and theoretical promises.
The impression that Hobbes left on later generations is that he was an advocate of absolute monarchy. However, the role that he played for the modern development of liberalism is similar to that of a founder because it was he pointed out that the purpose of the government was to protect some of the basic human rights. People had already possessed the right of freedom (the natural right) long before the advent of government. With the advent of government, freedom existed only in the broad space outside the legal prohibition imposed by the government. He specifically asserts that "in those places which do not fall under the jurisdiction of the rulers, the subjects have the right to act or not to act according to their own judgment."(10) Those are precisely the two basic propositions of modern liberalism. Of course, the basic human rights listed by the liberalists as fundamental human freedom had yet to undergo a process of gradual development. They originated from the laws during the religious reformation (the freedom to interpret religious doctrines). Martin Luther once expressed: " Unless all the man-made laws (referring to the ecclesiastical laws --- by the author), whatever their content, are completely abolished, there would be no hope of solving the problem. Only when we have possessed the freedom brought by the gospel can we make our judgments according to it and guide our life."(11)
The concept of freedom as represented by Hobbes and elaborated by Locke had obvious distinctions from the "republicanist" tradition. They maintained an absolute interpretation of freedom, that freedom is a state of absence of any restriction. For instance, Hobbes believes that "freedom is simply a state in which there is no obstacle to action." (12)They further believe that before the advent of the state, there was no imposition on any individual, hence every individual enjoyed real freedom. Of course, nature and other people would somehow constitute some kind of imposition and restriction on an individual, but this should by no means be equated with the lack of political freedom. The notion that man enjoyed his basic freedom before the advent of the state was later summarized as the theory of "divinely endowed human rights" and became universally accepted. Both Hobbes and Locke believed that the state is founded to ensure that people could naturally enjoy their freedom and rights. The purpose of the state itself determines the boundary of its legal action, that is, it must not deprive or jeopardize those liberties. Liberalists including Hobbes and Locke all admit that the existence of the state and its activities must impose some restrictions on the otherwise infinite freedom. This means that their political perspective was based on the premise of the absolute opposition between the state and freedom. This is their major difference from the republicanists. They never attempted to discover anything that could possibly unify freedom and imposition. Instead, they openly admit that imposition is the deprivation of freedom. They emphasize that the state's restrictions on individual freedom must not encroach upon the guarantee of basic personal liberty (fundamental human rights). Outside the legal restrictions, people could enjoy total freedom. Furthermore, since people establish their state for the purpose of protecting their freedom, they have the legitimate right to revolt against their state if the state seriously endangers their freedom and rights.
To sum up. Liberalists put forward a totally new definition of the relationship between freedom and law. Here, law becomes a mere instrument whose task is to provide concrete guarantee for freedom. In addition, the traditional "republicanist" subject of the relationship between freedom and mores was no longer mentioned. As man's "natural right", freedom directly appeals to man. Or, in the words of Spinoza, "we must regard the natural state as having neither religion nor law, therefore, there is no crime or mistakes. …we believe that the natural state preceded the law and the divine revelation. It does not stem from ignorance. Everybody is born free."(13)
The notion that freedom lies outside the legal restrictions was an important transformation in the Western interpretation of freedom in this period and this transformation significantly broadened the category of freedom. In contrast to the "republicanist" conception of freedom, the liberalists' understanding had obvious advantages because under certain circumstances the truth is not always with the majority. Moreover, in the actual political life, the majority does not really have the right to make political decisions. As far as the liberalists are concerned, Rousseau's and Hegel's interpretation of freedom not only provided foundation for the "tyranny of the majority" but also made possible the political imposition in the name of majority by some political forces. Historically, modern liberalists took freedom, one of the basic components of the naturally endowed human rights, as the premise of all legal and political systems and individual freedom could be guaranteed as long as such freedom did not obstruct the equivalent rights of others. The emergence of modern liberalism in Western Europe was a revolt against the then emerging tyrannical states, a reaction to ensure the freedom of citizens when the individual is confronted with the reinforced state power. In other words, while the state is acquiring an unprecedented power, its citizens are also endeavoring to discover a system that can guarantee the personal liberty and can be used to counterbalance the reinforced state power. It can be said that this is a natural expression of the concept of freedom in an era of tyrannical states. Or we can say that the emergence of this concept of freedom, which differs from its ancient counterpart, is somewhat inevitable. Therefore, the concept of freedom as represented by modern liberalism is the result of a distinctive understanding of the nature of the state and the relationship between the state and the society. It is also a form of rebellion against the modern tyrannical states. Undoubtedly, it is also the ultimate outcome of the gradual awakening of the individual consciousness. This type of interpretation of freedom served as the groundwork for all the political and legal systems of the modern state. From one aspect, this testifies to a basic choice that people made in pursuing their political freedom under the condition of modern states. Generally speaking, the concept of fundamental human rights as established by liberalism that any individual possesses some basic liberties which the state must not encroach upon or deprive under any circumstances has become a common understanding in Western political thought. It serves as the fundamental premise for any political discussion.
Nevertheless, there are some insurmountable problems inherent in the interpretation offered by modern liberalism. On one hand, the liberalists believe that man can enjoy full freedom in a natural condition devoid of the state. On the other hand, they admit that freedom is impossible because of the existence of various restrictions such as the conflicts among different individuals. Freedom may even turn into a struggle of "the entire population of one group against the entire population of another group," hence making the establishment of the state necessary. In this sense, the state can both guarantee and restrict human freedom. Since the natural state is nothing more than an illusion --- the majority of social-contract theoreticians admit this, fundamentally speaking, freedom is still located within the state, not outside the state. It is precisely on this point that Burke used the "English freedom" to criticize the abstract concept of freedom proposed by the French Revolution. Secondly, although some basic rights such as life and property became recognized as "naturally endowed liberties", such liberties would be completely abstract for those who do not possess any property. As for the question whether individual freedom can be fully exercised under the condition of not jeopardizing the freedom of others, it is a proposition that has never been subjected to rigorous scrutiny. Although modern liberalism played an important role in many countries in fighting against political tyranny, striving for the equal rights of citizens, and broadening political freedom, this doctrine of freedom is often too abstract to grasp, for it neglects many of the actual social and economic conditions. As pointed out by Rousseau, man is born free but he is still in eternal enslavement. It is also the dilemma that Sartre has revealed concerning human freedom.
Another basic characteristic of modern liberalism is that it is largely separated from morality and from the community of human society. Because of this, freedom can be the freedom of the strong to bully the weak; it can also be the freedom of those social members who possess certain amount of social resources to infinitely expand their personal interests. With regard to the former, Liang Qi Chao presented some fairly perceptive commentary. His explanation of the modern concept of freedom is: "Previously only those in positions of dominance are the strong men and now the dominated can also become the strong men. …When two strong men meet and two strong powers co-exist, they counteract on each other and the two powers become equal. Therefore, the right of freedom is the same thing as the strong power."(14) With respect to the latter, the actual social and political life in the modern period can provide some sufficient illustrations. One of the typical examples is whether the absolute freedom should be guaranteed in scientific research? Should the freedom to clone human being be guaranteed? Augustus wrote: " For those souls that rejoice over their own freedom and refuse to serve the God, they will be deprived of their control over their body that they originally possessed. Because they have intentionally rejected the God above them, they will have to lose the servants that are below them. In fact, they can no longer have control over their own actions. If otherwise they had obeyed the God, they would have been able to do so."(15) What Augustus was driving at was that freedom itself should be brought within some internal moral limits.
Post-modernist thinkers have conducted sufficient criticism over the inconsistencies inherent in the ideas of freedom since the Enlightenment. Their criticism focuses on two aspects. First, the criticism is directed toward the abstractness of modern liberalism. It is believed that the so-called "natural rights" were mere illusion. Foucault points out that there has never been such a thing as "primitive free space". He claims: "I am only concerned with the fact that all human relations are largely a relationship of powers."(16) Secondly, the criticism is directed at the kind of thinking in the Western intellectual tradition since the enlightenment, which completely identified reason and self-consciousness with freedom. Post-modernists judged such a practice as an absolute illusion and believe that what is really reflected by the so-called moral awareness is no more than a form of internalization in people's thought of the social relationship between power and control.
In his Genealogy of Morality, Foucault undertook some interesting reflections on the ethical concepts in ancient Greek and Roman period. According to Foucault, in ancient Greek and Roman culture, ethical concepts reflect the relationship between the individual and himself. They reflect the individual's command of his personal life and the purpose of education is to make people become better masters of themselves. Foucault goes on to say that while Kantian ethics emphasizes the individual's duty and obligation to others, the ethics in ancient Greece and Rome stressed the individual's control and command over his desires. At the same time, Greeks and Romans believed that the reason, which could perfectly control a person, could also perfectly control the whole city-state. It is clear that Foucault advocates ancient Greek and Roman culture as an alternative to modern civilization. He believes that such a culture might overcome the imposition brought by modernization on the so-called the internalization of man. Foucault hopes that a reconstruction of individual might be realized and the reconstructed individual might be able to, in a refined form, have totally new experiences of pleasure and desires. Of course, Foucault does not believe that the Greek and Roman concepts of ethics can be directly applicable to modern situation. In his words, "to re-examine the ancient Greeks today does not mean that we must regard Greek ethical concepts as our highest framework of reference. The key point is that the European intellectual tradition can renew Greek ideas and will value such an experience in order for people to obtain their complete freedom."(17)
Foucault believes that "the classical period has lost the awareness of the self as an autonomous mechanism … therefore some questions have been posed to us as they were posed to the ancients. As far as I am concerned, the pursuit of different styles among different people was what the different ancient groups had been doing and this has become the goal which we once again try to achieve"(18). He points out that the question is not simply "the discovery of the self" or the discovery of the inner existence of the self. It is a matter of constant creation of self. Foucault claims that his mission is to discover a space of freedom and a structure that may enable us to exist as self-sufficient entities."(19) For Foucault, the so-called liberty is a constant process of moral practice whereby the individual can arrive at a kind of self-command or self-contemplation. Freedom is the "ontological condition of ethics" and ethics "is an exquisite form by which the ethics can be realized."(20) While not neglecting the social and political conditions of freedom, Foucault stresses that the individual still has the ability to produce the freedom of practice by means of self-definition and self-control. Finally, he insists that the exercise of this ability may well become an important condition for the individual to break away the restrictions imposed by the society upon that individual. Foucault's thoughts on freedom may provide an important starting point to help us understand the concepts of freedom in Chinese intellectual traditions.
Part II: Chinese Ancient Concepts of Freedom
In ancient China, there was the usage of the concept of freedom, for example, in the Yu poem "The Peacock Flies Southeast", we have those lines: "If I brood with anger for a long time, how can you be free." There is the denotation of freedom in the sense of Western tradition. However, the concept had not been used in the context of moral and political pursuit until modern China, especially in orthodox Confucianism. But this is not to conclude that there was no individual pursuit of freedom in traditional Chinese culture. The pursuit of freedom by Jiao Zhongqing's wife as a representative of ordinary Chinese woman embodies a wish hidden in everyone's subconscious world. It is impossible that traditional Chinese culture has no response to such an important issue. Of course, the response might have been made in the entirely traditional Chinese category.
It may well be said that the traditional Chinese concept of freedom was formed during the periods of Spring and Autumn (c. 770-476 B.C.) and Warring States (c. 475-221 B.C.). It was developed into a system of thought in the Confucianist culture. The idea of freedom provided the traditional intellectual with a philosophy imbued with a strong sense of transcendentalism.
Any study of traditional Chinese ideas must start with the "devotion of oneself to the re-establishment of rites" advocated by Confucius. In fact, the social and political context that Confucius lived in was quite similar to that in which Socrates and Plato lived. It was characteristic of a downfall of the traditional values and customs in social and political lives and of the rapid development of the idea of freedom among the intellectual (the traditional Chinese saying is "rites destroyed the music collapsed"). And the remedy they prescribed for the social instability caused by such downfall was also similar: Plato's ideas and Confucius's "rites". Nevertheless, there were differences between Plato's "ideas" and Confucius's "rites". First, the application of Plato's ideas to politics has a strong flavor of elitism. That is to say, the knowledge of ideas are privileged to only a few social members. Accordingly, he elaborated a political pattern of social hierarchy. Confucius's "rites" are short of this feature, since rites are available to all through learning. Although "rites should not be applied to the plebian and penalty should not be imposed upon the official", Confucius emphasized that "education must be enforced among all classes of people."(21) Thus, "rites" are regarded as both political criteria in the society and norms of personal cultivation, and rites become the foundation of "self-cultivation, family maintenance, state administration and country unification." Secondly, another important difference between the "ideas" and "rites" lies in the fact that "rites" are characteristic of practice and demand their embodiment in everyday life, with no exception of gentleman. Thus, rites become a life style (in Foucault's terms) that common people imitate and an expression of world-view. Contrary to this, the ideas in Plato, as highly conceptualized logos expressed through language, have only the function of social control in practice but no applicability in universal human life.(22) It is because rites have the above-mentioned two features that Confucius tried his best to fulfill them though he knows that was impossible and took the re-establishment of rites as a mission for the rest of his life(23). But the objective results of his theory and practice were not to push society back to the ancient times (Of course, Plato failed, too). On the contrary, they provided a medium for the development of a new life style and new philosophy. Here, measure takes the place of aim. The thought derived from "rites" later became a bondage used by the ruling class to curb people's freedom, but at the same time it turns out to be the starting point of personal development through self-cultivation. That is why "rites" have advantages over "ideas". Therefore, it is wrong to deny the negative effect that "rites" produce upon individual freedom in the history of China; but while we recognize the negative effect produced by the thought of rites, we have to see that it at the same time possibly provided opportunity for the development of individual freedom, or provided a particular understanding of freedom. It is in this sense that an American scholar says that the striking characteristic of the East Asian thought lies in the universally accepted proposition that human being can consummate themselves through self-cultivation in everyday life.(24)
The key why Confucianism can provide such a possibility is that when Confucius proposed his theory of "rites", he did not exert a set of strict social and political criteria of behavior but a plan for the cultivation of a perfect personality. Confucius's thought about personal consummation includes the following aspects. First, he advocated a positive attitude towards secular life. Although he believed in "fate", what he stressed was a transcendental attitude towards material wealth and luxurious life. Thus he said "One's life is determined by fate."(25) This is at the same time a breadth of vision indifferent to fame and wealth noble to an individual, thus "it is fate whether Dao works or stops to work."(26) But this is not at all a pessimistic world-view. Otherwise, we would never have had the progressive spirit of "Fate has its way but a gentleman will make unremitting efforts to improve himself"(27) which has encouraged Chinese intellectuals for two thousand u years. This thought was further developed by Mencius, who says that, as for "reason" or the "Dao", one get it when pursuing it and loses it when stopping the pursuit, which means that pursuit helps obtaining and the pursuit lies in the individual; One does not get it though he has pursued and the obtaining of it depends on fate, which means that the pursuit does not help the obtaining and the pursuit lies outside of the individual."(28)
Secondly, Confucius believed in the possibility that there existed the universality of perfect personality. One characteristic of Confucianism is that its flavor of ethics is stronger than that of epistemology. The issue of possibility of the knowledge pf truth that has perplexed Western philosophers hardly exists in Confucianism. If morality may also be called truth, Confucius would be an optimist in this case. Once he asked himself: " Is benevolence far?" and answered: "When I want to exert benevolence, benevolence comes to me."(29) In fact, Confucianism is different from Kantian theory, which separates truth from morality. On the contrary, Confucius was like Socrates, believing "Knowledge is virtue" and "if one wants to attain self-cultivation, he must set right his mind first; if one wants to set right his mind, he must purify his desire first; if one wants to purify this desire, he must know the world first."(30) In the case of the possibility of knowledge, Confucianism also admits the difference between true knowledge and wrong views, which, however, is not as sharp and even opposite as that in Western philosophy. Mencius once said: "We are all human beings, some of us cherish lofty ideals while others are devoted to the gratification of bodily needs, why?" He then answered: "The sensory organs are closed to the external world if they are not used. Objects acting upon objects act upon the sensory organs."(31) Thus, the difference lies only in the fact whether one is able to or wants to know the external objects, not in the ability of knowledge itself.
Thirdly, Confucianism emphasizes the unlimitedness of personal perfection, that is, anyone can become a sage. This can be regarded as another advantage of Confucianism over Christianity for, like Christianity, Confucianism stresses a humble attitude when human beings confront nature and society and stresses personal cultivation and personal perfection. But at the same time, it takes a positive attitude towards the value of human beings. A French scholar comments: "what the master cares about is not an abstract philosophy about human beings, but an art of life that comprehends psychology, ethics, and politics. Morality is the result of an individual's efforts, not an innate attribute of the nobles."(32)
Fourthly, different from the emphasis on moral law in Kantian theory, Confucianism stresses an attitude of imitating nature and union with nature. This attitude seeks for an intrinsic harmony and union with the universe and humanity. In The Writings of Zuo Qiuming, Zuo says, "The rites are the laws of heaven, the justice of earth , and the codes of behavior of people."(33) Confucius also believed that "the right world-view of a gentleman should be vigorous and civilized, harmonious with heaven and in conformity with humanity."(34) The ideal state should be " following one's inclinations but never breaking the rules."(35) Mencius further expounded the thought, proposing his theory of "devoting the mind", "understanding the disposition", and "following the law of heaven", that is, "if one devotes his mind, he will understand his disposition; if one understands his disposition, he will know the law of heaven. Keep the mind, maintain the disposition, you will follow the law of heaven then."(36) By devoting one's mind and understanding one's disposition, one can know the world, thus "everything will be in me. By reflecting on oneself, one becomes sincere. What pleasure is in this!"(37) Mencius explained the concept of "sincerity" as follows: "Sincerity, the way of nature; seeking sincerity, the way of humanity."(38) Later, Zhu Xi made a very concise explanation about the relationship between "logic" and "disposition", saying that "disposition is the logic of nature. A man in possession of the disposition is in possession of everything."(39) This means that there exists a harmony between humanity and universe in intrinsic logic and structure. Mencius says, "A gentleman will be of another state when he passes away and will be of divinity when lives. He will be in union with heaven and earth wherever he goes. Can this be a trivial complementation?"(40)
This concept was further developed by Zhang Zai of the Southern Song Dynasty into "the unity of universe and humanity." He explained that "a Confucianist becomes sincere for his wisdom and becomes wise for his sincerity, hence the unity of the cosmos and humanity."(41) He said again, "If nature and humanity are kept apart from each other, there is no sincerity; if nature and human beings know differently, there is no wisdom to the utmost. What we call sincerity and wisdom is simply disposition and the law of heaven co-exist similarly in everything."(42) Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi proposed a theory of the organic whole of nature and humanity, believing that "a human being is human because he shares the justice of nature."(43) "The universe and humanity are never separated. Thus never talk about union."(44) Cheng Hao even said "what is of benevolence is completely blended with the objects as an organic whole."(45) " A sage is one with divinity and nature."(46) Wang Shouren, the representative of subjective idealism in the history of Chinese philosophy, said, "the mind is the Way; the Way is Nature; the knowledge of mind is the knowledge of the Way and of Nature." (47) The Song and Ming Confucianism expounded upon the sentence "humanity is the mind of heaven and earth" in the Book of Rites. Zhang Zai said that his meant humanity "is the heart of heaven and earth, thus heaven and earth are one with me."(48) Feng Youlan explained that "to set the heart for heaven and earth is to develop the human thought to the utmost and everything in the world and the law of the world are understood to the utmost."(49) It is clear that these scholars were just trying to provide an epistemological interpretation for the Confucianist morality. The union between epistemology, which starts from the knowledge of human life and comes to the knowledge of universe and then returns to the knowledge of human life, is an important feature of traditional Chinese thought.
Fifthly, different from the relativism in morality, Confucius praised a spirit that morality was higher than anything else, saying "people with lofty ideals will never do harm to benevolence for the sake of survival but will sacrifice themselves for the sake of benevolence."(50) Here "benevolence" can be interpreted as a moral ideal and also as a concept of moralized social justice. A very famous saying by Mencius is: "Life, my desire; justice, my desire too. When I cannot have both of them at the same time, I will maintain justice at the expense of my life."(51) This spirit of maintaining justice at the cost of life became the spiritual pillar of the ancient Chinese intellectual. It was expressed both as an opposition against feudal ruling system and as an defense of national cause. The most recent example was the attitude of the six gentlemen in the Reform of 1898.
At last, the ethics of Confucius expresses a feature of self-cultivation-centralism, but its final aim is still the concern for society and common people, even love. This is why "an intellectual is no intellectual if he does not maintain justice, thus shouldering heavy responsibilities. Isn't benevolence heavy once you take it as your task? Isn't benevolence lofty since you take it as your task until the day of your death?"(52) In accordance with the concept of benevolence, this social concern and human love have become a lofty ideal of life among ancient Chinese intellectuals. Confucius defined a gentleman as a person whom "one can entrust his infant to, appoint heavy tasks to, and who will never forsake his ideas for his own sake. What is a gentleman? A gentleman is a human being."(53)
The above-mentioned aspects of Confucianism were developed by some Confucianists in history, especially Mencius, who particularly expounded upon the aspect of self-cultivation and self-improvement with everlasting efforts. He said: "human beings who are different from animals and fowls are those gentlemen."(54) "The attaining and losing lies in me since I gain when I pursue and lose when I give up."(55) "What kind of person is Shun? And what kind of person am I? We are similar as long as we try our best to benefit the society."(56) This proposition was later expounded as "everyone can be a Yao or Shun."(57) And this became the core of his theory of "cultivation of disposition." Zhou Dunyi of the Southern Song Dynasty provided further explanation, saying "can we learn to be sages? The answer is yes. Are there any good ways? The answer is concentration, which means absence of desires. The absence of desire makes one tranquil and modest, energetic and upright. Being tranquil and modest makes one wise, and wisdom makes one open-minded; Being energetic and upright makes one fair and just, and fairness and justice make one broad. Wisdom, open-mindedness, justice and breadth: attributes of a sage!"(58)
Compared with Confucius, Mencius even more emphasized the spirit of free responsibility of the subject. He explicitly said, "Benevolence is applied to the relation between father and son; justice, to that of monarchy and subjects; courtesy, to that of host and guest; wisdom, to persons of virtue. Fate determines the necessity for the sages abide by the law of the universe, but this necessity is also rooted in the human nature of the sage. Therefore, the sage does not allow himself to be solely dictated by fate"(59) This thought is similar to Satre's free choice in a sense but not as pessimistic as Satre's. Mencius explained the manner of a gentleman as "living under heaven, standing above earth, and acting according to the Way of the universe; when having a successful career, coming among the plebian; when not having a successful career, taking peremptory actions. Wealth will not make him loose; poverty will not move his ideals, and Power or force will not subdue him. Only this makes a person a man of nobility."(60) Mencius, starting from his theory of personal cultivation, even believed that pains and ordeals in this life are all means for an individual to perfect his personality. His most quoted motto is: " When heaven appoints a person to undertake a great mission, he must first of all suffer from a spiritual pain, undergo physical hardships and be distracted from his actions. In this way, his soul will be touched upon and he can develop a spirit of perseverance and endurance. He will be strengthened to perform what he could not perform."(61)
Xun Kuang emphasized the objectivity of "justice" and "courtesy." For him, "justice" and "courtesy" were not something a legislator prescribed arbitrarily or blindly. They were constructed as objective realities rather than as ethical qualities. They were products of history, thus derived from an origin of rationality. The rationality of social order lied in them. (62) That is to say, "Heaven operates according to seasons, earth contributes its wealth, and human society is organized with order. This constitutes heaven-earth-humanity trinity"(63)
In addition, Confucianism was supplemented by other traditional thoughts, especially by Taoist thought. The core of Taoism can be summarized as a kind of "pan-naturalism", that is, a tendency of thought that unifies the universe and human world into Nature. This thought is similar to Rousseau's notion, which believes that civilization means the degeneration of human nature. In Taoism, especially in Zhuang Zhou, the essential way for human race to realize freedom is by eliminating all "pollutions" of civilization, by following and developing human nature completely. Zhuang Zhou called this human nature "De"(the power of Tao). He said: "At the very beginning there was void. Void was not named and the universe started from it. From the universe there came the physique. Thus objects came into being due to the power of the Way."(64) Zhuang put Nature and Humanity in opposition. He even pointed out in a metaphor: "Heaven is intrinsic and Humanity is extrinsic. … That cattle and horses have four feet is determined by heaven. Haltering the heads of horses and penetrating the noses of the cattle are done by human beings."(65) Zhuang reiterated that, observing Nature, man can gain true happiness, hence freedom; if man imposes his will upon Nature in order to change it, man will impose a bondage upon himself as a consequence. That is to say, "the legs of wild ducks are short, but they become disadvantageous when extended; The legs of cranes are long, but disaster will result if shortened. Therefore, something that is long by nature should not be extended artificially and something that is short by nature should not be extended arbitrarily. Otherwise, there will be disaster."(66)
The Taoist idea of emulating nature constitutes an important complement to the Confucian doctrine. Although both the Confucian and the Taoist doctrines may have some differences concerning the notion of "the Way", some Taoist notions of emulating nature provided a major framework of reference for the Confucianists in comprehending some of the difficult concepts like the "divine reason" and "disposition". As a matter of fact, the Golden Mean had already contained the type of thought that roughly corresponded to the notions of "the intangible Way" and "following nature" contained in the doctrines of Lao Tzu and Zhuang Tzu. The Golden Mean propounds that "Therefore, the supreme sincerity is without sound, and that which is without sound will last; and that which lasts will hold together; and that which holds together will expand; and that which expand will be profound and far reaching; and that which is profound and far reaching will remain high and bright; The profound and the far-reaching can provide firm support and the high and the bright can supply broad inclusiveness. The expansive can result in fruition. The profound and the far-reaching harmonizes with the earth while the high and the bright harmonizes with heaven."(67) This is what is meant by "the consummation of morality to provide firm support ". The later elaboration of the traditional Confucian concept of the "sage" by Wang Bi in the East Han Dynasty contained similar Toist notions of obedience to nature and non-government: "So the Sage has insights into the law of nature and into the principles of the universe. Therefore he rules by non-government and act in coordination with nature."(68) In addition, although the Confucian doctrine is characterized by positive aggression, the orthodox Confucian theories is also always coupled by notions of "following nature", "tranquility of mind", and "non-action", providing the ancient Chinese intellectuals with a major frame of reference for self-contemplation. When we appreciate the following poem While Drinking by Tao Qian, we are bound to perceive a spontaneous glorification of nature and liberty:
I
built a cottage in the midst of men
Feng Youlan claims that this concept of freedom represents a spontaneous detachment from restrictions. Especially when the intellectuals are cast into adversity and "withdraw from the political world to devote themselves to the perfection of their temperament", this doctrine provides them with infinite possibilities to identify themselves with nature and to come to an in-depth understanding of their own humanity and character. This is well demonstrated in the life style and the thoughts of the "Seven Sages of the Bamboo Forest". Their bohemianism or freedom is most vividly described by a line from Ruan Ji: "Who says that things are difficult in this world? / Freedom may enable one to have a lifetime of self-satisfaction."(69) It is not advisable to regard such an attitude simply as a form of self-comfort for intellectuals in adversity. Generally speaking, "the combination of Confucianism and Taoism" is the typical feature of the intellectual life in Chinese tradition.
It is based on those characteristics as mentioned above that people have come to the general conclusion that the Confucian doctrine displays strong humanistic qualities. Lin Yu Tang made a summary of the spirit of the Confucianism and he believes that "the emergence of humanism in Chinese tradition has as its objective to enlighten. By enlightenment, we mean both wisdom and reason, which indicates a harmony between emotion and reason."(70) To be specific, this humanist spirit expresses itself as a thought of human-centralism. Xun Kuang said: "Water and fire have air in them but no life; grass and woods have life in them but no perception; fowls are animals have perception but no sense of justice. Human beings have air, life, perception, and justice, thus being the most noble creature under heaven."(71) Dong Zhongshu said: "Man governs everything below him and unifies with heaven and earth. Thus man remains unparalleled in his nobility in the universe."(72) Meanwhile, the idea comprehends the optimistic spirit that human beings can know the laws of human life and of the universe, e.g. "Li"(logic) or "Dao"(the Way). In one word, it reiterates the ideal of freedom which is realized through the harmony and unity between humanity and nature, as is further expounded in the following text.
Starting those premises, we can infer that within the larger framework of the Confucianism there is a distinctive ideal of personal freedom. The ideal is that a universe of infinite freedom can be created by comprehending the moral and the natural law and by a willing personal coordination with nature and the society. On the other hand, this does not automatically imply that one should always be subservient to the existing natural or social order. The foundation of a gentleman's words and action is the "Way". Therefore, in its most essential aspects, Confucianism still contains an element of rebellious spirit.
Part III: The Complementary Nature between Chinese and Western Concepts of Freedom
To undertake a comparison between Chinese and Western political traditions is a very challenging task because both of these traditions, being long in history and substantial in content, consist of many different and even contradictory components. To some extent, it is still unresolved whether either of them can be legitimately regarded as an autonomous system. Therefore, any attempt at a simple comparison will necessarily be one-sided and inexact in one way or another. It is with a clear awareness of those possible limitations that we attempt to arrive at some tentative conclusion.
First of all, we can find that, in the development of Western political tradition, the understanding of liberty was divided into distinctive stages and the understanding at each stage was characterized by different implications. If we exclude the ancient Greek understanding of freedom as an independent stage of development, we can say that both the republicanist tradition and modern liberalism have come up with some very different interpretations of freedom. The former emphasizes on the congruity between liberty and law and the congruity between freedom and reason. A further analysis would reveal that this congruity can be interpreted as the self-identification of the moral agent. The only difference is that the former is direct and unmediated while the latter must be mediated by reason.
To look from the positive side, we will find that the republicanist interpretation of liberty highlights the congruity between freedom and law and reason. To look from the negative side, we will find that it emphasizes on proper limitation of freedom and the division between liberty and license. Admit it or not, personal liberty is always restricted by the liberty of others and by the objective conditions of society under any social circumstances. On this point, the republicanist tradition of liberty has its grain of truth. However, this type of interpretation has its intrinsic limitations and contradictions. This is because, first of all, law as an expression of the collective will of the citizens can only be regarded as a hypothesis under most cases of social practice. No citizen can legislate for himself and still be able to maintain an agreement with his fellow countrymen. Law in general is largely a form of historical accumulation and, at its best it is the result of the minority's compliance with the majority during specific historical periods. As is mentioned above, the republicanist tradition has failed to put forward any satisfactory answer on the issue whether an individual citizen's compliance with law is an indication of his personal will. Political thinkers since Rousseau's time have substituted "the public will" or "reason" for law and emphasized the identity between the personal will, reason and liberty. What is actually meant by all this is that true liberty is always in conformity with reason. From an abstract perspective, this is a plausible statement. But the problematic nature of this statement becomes immediately manifest when we take into consideration whether it is legitimate to bring a judgment of reason into the political sphere. Rousseau's attempt to identify the "public will" with the majority decision has always met with severe criticism by the liberalists. For a simple fact is that truth or reason is not always with the political majority. Therefore, even though liberty means compliance with reason, the conclusion is not necessarily that liberty implies compliance with the majority because here the possibility of "tyranny of the majority" is suggested. The tyrannical nature of Hegelian concept, which identifies reason with the will of the state or the interests of the state, is even more obvious because, according to this concept, reason can be a disguise for the will or the interests of the minority.
On account of the inadequacies as are mentioned above, the republicanist concept of freedom appeared especially powerless during the period when modern nation state emerged whose state power has been comprehensively strengthened. This is because objectively it has been turned into a restriction of personal freedom, which cannot otherwise impose any institutional control over the action of the state. The presence of those inadequacies is the key reason for the fact that the republicanist tradition finally gave way to the liberalist interpretation of freedom in the modern times. Liberalists tended, by means of the concept of natural rights, to make absolute the freedom of life, property, thought and speech and to transform those forms of freedom into the foundation of modern nation and its legal system. Although the theory of natural rights and natural law is a mere hypothesis, it finally won general recognition in the West, which indicates that the liberalist interpretation of freedom promises to provide a fundamental guarantee for personal liberty under the new political context of modern nation states. At the same time, it indicates that those personal liberties, sometimes termed as "natural rights", have gradually been accepted in modern society as a fundamental human condition. It is an indication of social progress. In other words, the fundamental freedom that liberalists were trying to safeguard could now been accepted as a basic political condition of modern society. That is to say, the boundary of liberty has been extended beyond those basic liberties.
For the first time in human history, the liberalist concept of freedom provided a truly specific definition for personal life, both theoretically and legally making the guarantee of those fundamental liberties the fundamental purpose of the state and the society. This concept also developed freedom into a human right that all citizens could equally enjoy, regardless of their differences in social status, education and wealth. Those are the advantages of the liberalist tradition over the republicanist tradition, which constituted the most fundamental reason for the significant promotion of the cause of liberty of humanity in the modern world. But on the other hand the liberalist concept is coupled with some major difficulties and inadequacies. First of all, such a concept appears rather abstract. That is to say, what is guaranteed is merely the possibility of freedom rather than the actual freedom itself. For those whose social status and other random factors determine that they do not possess or hardly possess the conditions of freedom, freedom has literally and largely become meaningless. Because early liberalism emphasizes limitations on the actions of the state, this problem has become all the more serious. Although the liberalists since the beginning of utilitarianism have become aware of the society's obligation to provide certain necessary conditions for the individuals to fulfill their basic liberties, liberalism still lacks a personalized criterion because the utilitarian argument focuses on the maximization of social utilities.
Secondly, liberalism expressed itself in the form of individualism, therefore it only acknowledges some minimum limitations on personal liberty, that is, not impinging on the equal freedom of others. It is apparent that such a notion ignores the free society or the free conditions, as is demonstrated in Locke's theory. Furthermore, the liberalist conception also relinquishes the moral requirements of the free subjects. Locke's solution was to allow religion to accomplish this task, but the mainstream liberalism was to circumvent this difficult problem by isolating politics from morality. In this aspect, liberalism can be characterized as a complete reaction of the republicanist tradition, which becomes the main reason for its incurring much criticisms from socialism and other doctrines outside liberalism itself.
In comparison with the West, the concept of liberty in Chinese tradition displays some similarities to the republicaist tradition---the emphasis on freedom and reason (the concepts of "divine reason", "the way", and "nature" in the Chinese tradition) and on the inner restriction of liberty. Of course, such a characteristic makes it inevitable that the Chinese intellectual tradition shares some of the defects of the republicanist tradition. In order words, the excessive emphasis on "reason" and "nature" might override personal liberty and the individuality. Especially since the Song Dynasty, the influence of orthodoxy and, more importantly, the increasingly arbitrary nature of the political rule put "the divine reason" in complete opposition to "human desires". "Reason" became a mere instrument employed to repress personal liberty through the internalization of the political order. This is why many intellectuals such as Lu Xun since the May 4th Movement have described the Chinese history as a history of human slaughter conducted by the Confucian and feudal ethical code. Such an ethical concept of freedom demonstrates some of its paradoxes. For instance, Liang Shu Ming asserts: "The Chinese are in a position between freedom and non-freedom --- they do not enjoy absolute freedom but they are not totally deprived of their freedom."(73) There is no equivalent to the modern Western liberalism in Chinese intellectual tradition. Faced with the increasingly powerful totalitarian state, the individual virtually had no means whatsoever of protecting his freedom and other legitimate rights.
This question deserves further discussion. The ancient China was a society of low stratification and an important characteristic of traditional Chinese culture is the unity of society and politics. In ancient China, the orthodox ethical code functioned much like the Western law. It served both as a form of social and moral standards and as a form of political standards. In the traditional Western thought, liberty was always defined in connection with politics and law. Therefore, although the republicanist tradition emphasizes the deference of freedom to law, strictly speaking, the law in this tradition is merely regarded as an institutionalized intermediary. The agent of freedom achieves an inner union with itself through the mediation of law. Secondly, the nature of equality inherent in law enables it to develop into an important tool for the guarantee of freedom. This possibility has been turned into reality in the liberalist tradition. In contrast, in traditional Chinese thought, the Ethical Code does not function as an intermediary similar to the Western law. It lays greater emphasis on the control and the elevation of the individual, therefore it is possible that personal freedom will be in a state of constant repression. On the other hand, the hierarchical nature and the relative indeterminateness of the Ethical Code itself prevent the Code itself from developing into an effective instrument to restrict the power of the government in practice. Those are the inherent deficiencies of Chinese tradition on matters of freedom.
On the other hand, compared with the Western concept of freedom, the Chinese concept has some distinctive advantages and they can be described as the following. First, because Chinese ancient tradition emphasizes from the outset the unity between Ethics, the Way, and the "Divine Reason" in the development of an individual's personality, it has fundamentally precluded the possibility of interpreting liberty as license. It stresses the congenial and harmonious relationship between the development of personal freedom, society and nature, therefore it is possible to prevent extreme individualism and the increasingly obvious conflicts and contradictions between man and nature typical in the Western cultural tradition. Of course, we should not say that the Chinese tradition overlooks the existence of those conflicts. Xun Tzu points out that "desire and evil belong to the same thing. Desires are many and materials are meager. Conflicts arise thereof."(74) Fortunately, the Chinese found a unique way to adjust this kind of conflicts. Lin Yu Tang also points out that "although the humanistic spirit inherent in the Chinese tradition have failed to evolve into the Western legal system, it nevertheless has helped the formation of a relatively peaceful and tolerant culture in which individuality is relatively free to develop. By contrast, the Western cultural mode which is largely characterized by force and aggression runs counter to the theory of Golden Mean."(75)
Next, the Chinese tradition emphasis the possibility of attaining infinite perfection by means of self-cultivation. This perfection of personality is realized largely through an understanding of the objective laws of nature and society and through the self-adjustment based on this understanding. Therefore, to a great extent, the Chinese tradition can overcome the conflicts between the individual and nature and the conflict between the individual and society as expounded by the liberalist ideas of the West, conflicts that tend to arise when there are limited natural and social resources in the human society.
Thirdly, the notion of reliance on nature as proposed by the traditional Chinese concept of freedom provides a possible solution to the relationship between an individual and another individual and between man and nature. In contrast to the Western ideas, nature is not proposed as an opposite of human society. Neither is it an object for human conquest. It is the source of human inspiration and human ideas and the basis for human thought and action. It is the place for the cultivation of human temperament and for self-entertainment through the realization of complete unity with it. It is the companion with which it is possible to maintain a relationship of coordination for fulfilling personal freedom. The Chinese tradition regards human society as an integral component of the larger universe and stresses their internal unity. In a certain sense, this tradition has worked out the problem created by Western liberalism. When translating Mill's On Liberty, Yan Fu proposed his understanding of freedom: " Freedom means to be able to do whatever one desires within the limits of reason. It is like the independent life of someone in the wilderness. Is there any limit to his realm of freedom? Whether he is willing to do good or do evil, all depends on himself. There is nobody out there who can forbid all that he does. But if he enters human society and insists that he must enjoy freedom where everybody else is enjoying his freedom and still accepts no limitation, then he is inside a world of power politics and conflicts will be inevitable. Therefore, one can joy his freedom only under the condition of not endangering the freedom of others. This is the highest principle with which a gentleman can rely on in his government of the country."(76) Although Yan Fu might not be correct in his understanding of the Western concept of freedom from the perspective of Chinese intellectual tradition, he can still provide us with some important edification if we regard his interpretation as an explanation undertaken by a Chinese within the framework of his native cultural tradition.
Finally, the "Ethical" understanding of freedom is somehow different from the emphasis on the unity between freedom and reason in the Western tradition. To a great extent, the "Ethical Code" as an imitable mode of life can surmount the abstract nature inherent in reason, thereby turning freedom into a highly individualized mode of life. Li Ze Hou asserts that the most significant contribution of Confucius is his having internalized the external ethical code into an inner self-awareness of the subject. In this way, it can come closer to the actual feeling of life, emotional experience and the common sense of life.(77) Li Ze Hou further points that the transformation created by Confucius demystified the otherwise mystical "Ethical Code" and made "the cultivation of one's temperament" into a historical responsibility and a supreme duty possible to accomplish for individual members of society. In this way, the dignity of the individual, together with his initiative, his independence and his sense of historical responsibility, becomes significantly enhanced.
If
we define liberty as a state in which human thought and action
incur no external limitations, the achievement of liberty
will have to depend on two essential conditions: the elimination
of external obstacles and the enhancement of the behavioral
competence of the free agent. In the entire process of human
pursuit of freedom, the Western tradition emphasizes on the
former while the Chinese tradition stresses the latter. Therefore,
we might come to the conclusion that the Chinese concept and
the Western concept regarding the issue of liberty can complement
each other. For the Chinese, the acceptance of the Western
concept of liberty, especially the liberalist concept of liberty,
may well serve as an important precondition for the genuine
guarantee of our freedom. Likewise, the interpretation of
liberty as represented by the Chinese tradition may supply
possible conditions for a coordinated and infinite development
of humanity's quest for liberty. |
(1)
Hesiod, "Works and Days", cf., Michael Gagarin and
Paul Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to
the Sophists, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995,
pp.16-17.
(2) Aristotle (ancient Greek): Political Science, Commercial
Press, 1965, p. 135
(3) Ditto, pp. 150 - 151
(4) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Kitchener, Batoche Boks,
1999, Book 5,6,p.82.
(5) Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the commonwealth and On the
laws, edited by James E. G. Zetzel, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999, p. 30.
(6) Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the commonwealth and On the
laws, edited by James E. G. Zetzel, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999, p. 20.
(7) Saint Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, Edited
and translated by R. W. Dyson, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998, Book V, Chap. 18.
(8) Leonardo Bruni, "Laudatio Florentinae Urbis," in H. Baron (ed.), From Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni, Chicago,
1968, p. 259
(9) cf., Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State:
The acquisition and transformation of the language of politics
1250-1600, Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1992,
(10) Ditto, p. 171
(11) Reformation Writings of Martin Luther, ed. Bertram Lee
Woolf, London: Lutterworth, 1952, Vol. 1, p 345.
(12) Thomas Hobbes: On Citizens, edited and translated by
Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998, p. 111.
(13) Baruch Spinoza: Theistic Political Science, Commercial
Press, 1982, pp. 222 - 223
(14) See Letter of Freedom in Ice Drink Suite, Collection
of Ice Drink Suite Volume II
(15) Saint Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans,
Edited and translated by R. W. Dyson, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998, Book 13, Chap. 13.
(16) Michel Foucault, "The Ethic of Care for the Self
as a Practice of Freedom", in James Bernauer and David
Rasmussen (eds) The Final Foucault, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1988, p. 168
(17) Michel Foucault, 'Final Interview', Raritan, 1985, No.
5, p. 7.
(18) Ibid., p. 12.
(19) Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in
Paul Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault Reader, New York: Pantheon,
1984, p. 43.
(20) Michel Foucault, "The Ethic of Care for the Self
as a Practice of Freedom", op. cit., p. 4.
(21) Confucian Analects: Duke Ling of Wei
(22) The difference of the social and political functions
of the "rites" as a ceremony from those of other
social norms expressed in written language , such as "law."
See J. G. A. Pocock: Politics, "Ritual, Language, Power:
An Essay on the Apparent Political Meanings of Ancient Chinese
Philosophy", in Language and Time, Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1989
(23) Confucian Analects: Xianwen 14·38
(24) (US)Duweiming: New Theory on Confucianism: Creative Conversion
of Self, Jiangsu People's Publishing House, 1996, p.14
(25) Confucian Analects: Yan Yuan
(26) Confucian Analects: Xianwen
(27) Legends of Change: Change of Yuan
(28) Works of Mencius: Jinxin A
(29) Confucian Analects: Part VII, Chapter 29
(30) The great Learning
(31) Works of Mencius: Volume VI chapter 15
(32) (French)Xiehenai: Chinese History of Social Development,
Jiangsu People's Publishing House, 1995, p. 75
(33) Zuo Qiuming's Commentary: 25th Year of Duke Zhao
(34) Legends of Change
(35) Confucian Analects: On Governance
(36) Works of Mencius: Jinxin A
(37) Ditto
(38) Works of Mencius: Li Lou
(39) Quotations from Master Zhu
(40) Works of Mencius: Jinxin A
(41) Zhang Zai: Works of Zhang Zai, p. 65
(42) Ditto, p. 20
(43) Works of the Two Chengs, p. 1272
(44) Ditto, p. 81
(45) Ditto, p. 16
(46) Ditto, p. 22
(47) Wang Shouren: Records on Studies
(48) Ditto
(49) Feng Youlan: New Edition of the History of Chinese Philosophy
(50) Confucian Analects: Duke Ling of Wei
(51) Works of Mencius: Gao Zi A
(52) Confucian Analects: Taibo
(53) Ditto, 8 ·6
(54) Works of Mencius: Li Lou B
(55) Ditto, Jinxin A
(56) Ditto, Duke Wen of Teng A
(57) Ditto, Gao Zi B
(58) Zhou Dunyi: History: Studies on Historical Records
(59) Works on Mencius: Jinxin B
(60) Ditto, Duke Wen of Teng B
(61) Ditto, Volume VI, Part 2, Chapter 15
(62) See (French) Xiehenai: Chinese History of Social Development,
Jiangsu People's Publishing House, 1995, p. 84
(63) Master Xun: On Heaven
(64) Master Zhuang: On Heaven and Earth
(65) Master Zhuang: Autumn Water
(66) Master Zhuang: Parallel Sentences
(67) Annotations of the Four Books: The Doctrine of the Mean
(68) Works of Wang Bi, p. 77
(69) Ruan Ji: Thirty-six Lyrical Poems
(70) Spirit of Chinese Culture: see China and the World: Selected
Works of Lin Yu-tang, International Cultural Publishing Co,
p. 547
(71) Master Xun: The Kingly System
(72) The Spring and Autumn Dews: Heaven and Earth, the Positive
and the Negative
(73) Liang Sou-ming: The Gist of Chinese Culture, Xuelin Press,
1987, p. 254
(74) Master Xun: On National Prosperity
(75) Spirit of Chinese Culture: see China and the World: Selected
Works of Lin Yu-tang, International Cultural Publishing Co,
pp. 549 - 550
(76) Yan Fu: Definitions on Popular Power: Translation Examples
(77) Li Zehou: Theoretical Studies on China's Ancient Ideology,
Works of Li Zehou in One Decade, Volume III, Anhui Art and
Literature Press, 1994, pp. 23 - 26
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