文化的全球化是一个颇有争议的命题与论断，究竟是否存在文化的全球化，怎样界定和理解文化的全球化，文化的全球化对现实的国际关系产生着哪些影响，如何应对文化全球化，本文拟对上述问题作初步探讨。

　　—考虑欠妥的科索沃战争已危及同中国和俄罗斯的关系，并使北约陷入危险境地

　　在巴尔干半岛遥远的边缘上所爆发的一场战争，其政治后果已远超出了科索沃这一范围。在俄罗斯，北约的行径所引起的一种激愤的羞辱感已弥漫开来，上至高层人士，下及普通百姓，并威胁着使俄美关系在未来的数年中倍受摧残凋零。在北京，民众围绕着中国驻贝尔格莱德大使馆被炸一事所作出的过激反应，使蓄积多月的对中美关系大起大落的恼怒情绪得以尽情渲泄。

　　俄国与中国作出上述反应，其原因十分显而易见。这两个国家的领导人是其社会的产物，这种社会对战争与和平决策的理解，取决于这些决策是否能增强一个国家的安全，或促进其他至关重要的利益。如果他们找不到这样的传统理由来解释美国的举动，他们便会将我们的行为动机归咎于某种隐匿的称霸计划，而不会将其归诸于所谓的利他主义。

　　克林顿政府中的那些得力干将，其成长经历要么源于越战抗议运动的战壕，要么则来自总统竞选运动――或者两者兼而有之。由于对武力在外交政策中的作用心存疑虑，他们在使用这种武力时，便显得既缺乏效用，又缺乏信仰。他们强调诸如环境等“柔性问题”，而对国际均势或美国传统利益这类观念则漠不关心，将其耻笑为陈旧过时。由于过分受制于民意测验，他们总是情不自禁地将外交政策当作国内政治的一种延伸来对待。他们所从事的外交活动，在处理短期的战术问题时显得游刃有余，但在关乎战略的问题上是表现得愚钝无比；他们擅长于“拨弄”公共舆论，但对于用整整一代人的鲜血和生命换来的关于空中打击的局限以及“阶段性战事升级”观念之徒劳无益的教训，他们却置若罔闻，无动于衷。

　　朗布依埃会议并非像人们经常所说的那样是一场谈判，而是一种最后通牒。对于一个在其就职之际宣誓将致力于联合国宪章与多边磋商程序的政府来说，这标志着一种多么令人惊讶的出尔反尔。北约从一个纯粹防御性的集团转而成为一个准备以武力将其价值观强加于人的机构，正值三个前苏联的卫星国加入该联盟的那几个月。这削弱了美国及其盟国再三作出的承诺，即由于北约自身的条约声称它仅是个防御性机构，故俄罗斯对于北约东扩无需惧怕。

　　由此看来，科索沃便成为俄罗斯后冷战时期遭受挫败的一个象征。作为莫斯科的传统友邦（铁托统治时期两国关系的中断排除在外），南斯拉夫所遭受的劫难，凸现了俄罗斯作为一个大国的衰落，并导致了针对美国和西方的一种敌对情绪，最终有可能促使俄罗斯染上民族主义和社会主义色彩，令其与20世纪30年代的欧洲法西斯主义情形相仿。这对于克林顿政府执行的支持俄罗斯改革并诱使俄罗斯更加亲近西方的政策来说，将不啻是一个令人悲哀的结局。

　　值得称道的是，克林顿政府从一开始起便认识到了将俄罗斯纳入国际社会的重要性。但该政府将此项努力主要等同于在俄国国内推进民主改革和市场经济，在国外确保俄罗斯不扩散核武器。所有这一切，使俄国更痛切地觉得自己已置身于某种殖民托管之下。反过来，俄罗斯则在许多方面坚持其传统外交：力图削弱我们的势力范围，尤其是在中东地区。俄国关于它自身作为世界舞台上的一个历史角色的形象，必须予以严肃对待。这需要少一点训斥，多一点对话；少一点感情用事，而应更多地意识到，俄罗斯的国家利益与我们的国家利益并非总是协调一致；少一点对社会问题的指手划脚，多一点外交攻心。

　　在其驻贝尔格莱德使馆被炸之前，中国对北约实施的这场空中打击的反应没有俄罗斯那么激烈，但同样是持负面态度。每个民族都是透过其历史的棱镜来审视国际事件的。对于中国而言，北约的人道主义干预这一新学说会令其回忆起欧洲在19世纪单方面宣布的“文明使命”，正是这一所谓的文明使命致使中国山河破碎，并招致西方列强的一系列干涉。

　　那种在两国之间维持密切关系的政策，现在在两国首都均遭到质疑。克林顿总统的政策，基于自Richard Nixon以来其所有前任的一条信念，即无论是中国还是美国，均能从合作中获益匪浅；而对抗则会使双方陷入精疲力竭的危险境地。就中国来说，两国关系的破裂将会重创其经济计划和现代化进程。于美国而言，这一事态势必会造成亚洲的全面震荡，置中国的邻国于两难选择而倍受煎熬：要么不得不去选择那个其5000年历史使其在亚洲具有举足轻生地位的世界人口最众多的国家，要么不得不去选择美国这个世界上唯一的超级大国。

　　对贝尔格莱德中国使馆的轰炸成为导火索，触发了两国关系的爆炸。彼此的猜疑吞噬着对方。

　　对与中国合作政策持批判态度的人可分为两大阵营。第一个群体认为，中国作为一个大国的崛起势必会威胁到美国的关键利益。第二个群体则对中国从人权到核扩散所实施的诸般具体政耿耿于怀。勿庸置疑，中国在诸多方面的所作所为折射出了一个正在崛起的大国那种非情绪化的政策。虽然如此，但中美之间的分歧仍可以通过耐心和坚实的外交而避免演化为对抗。而在其他诸多领域中，双方不乏和谐一致的利益。倘若在没有直接挑战的情况下，中国作为一个世界强国的崛起，以及中国的政治体制，被转变为美国敌视中国的缘由，那么，我们所踏上的将是一条孤独寂寞的路途，无论是在欧洲，抑或是在亚洲，我们均无从获得任何大国的支持。在此，我对这种冒险行为郑重提出警告，因为它将在未来的几十年中歪曲我们的亚洲政策。

　　虽然北约峰会视若团结，但科索沃危机已使关于该联盟未来的辩论显得不可避免。

　　在北约峰会上所被回避的问题不容继续延宕。具体而言，北约在所谓“战区外”冲突中的恰当使命是什么？欧洲和美国的相对地位是什么？对于稳定欧洲部分地区或邻近的战略地区，该联盟是否具备严肃认真的政治或军事策略？

　　人道主义干预这一概念的提出，被视作此届政府对外交政策所采取的新方法的一种贡献。然则，没有任何其他问题比这一概念更亟待重新思考的了。在科索沃实施的空中打击，其正义性在于确立了这样一个原则，即国际社会――或至少是北约――将会从此对某些政府侵犯其自己的人民的行为严惩不贷。但是，在阿尔及利亚、苏丹、塞拉里昂、克罗地亚、卢旺达、高边索地区、库尔德地区以及其他许多地区，我们却并没有这么做。而对于亚洲――例如在印尼和菲律宾――正在出现的种族冲突，我们又该持何种态度呢？所给出的答案往往是，我们只在那些没有不必要风险的地区才采取军事行动，而不是到处出兵。然而，作出上述区分的标准又是什么呢？而那种声称通过摧毁其对手的民用经济，使之倒退几十年，并因此可避免蒙受军事伤亡的人道主义，又能算作哪档子的人道主义呢？

　　道德原则言之凿凿。但外交政策必须永远注重目的与手段之间的调和与平衡。种族清洗固然令人痛恨，但这一事实并不能排除去构想更为恰当的应对方法的必要性。在科索沃悲剧的每个阶段，其他一些外交与武力并用的手段唾手可得，虽然这些手段是否曾被认真考虑过，现在尚不得而知。那种仅从15，000英尺的高空来证实其道德信仰之正义性――且在此过程中将塞尔维亚摧毁殆尽并使科索沃居民背井离乡、流离失所――的战略，所产生的难民和伤亡人数早已超过了所有其他可以想象到的武力与外交并用的手段所会产生的数量。无论是按照政治理由还是依据道德原则，这一政策都理应遭到质询。

　　美国全然可以因其将人权提高到外交政策的一个有机部分这一做法而引以自豪。但当人们目睹了美国整个变本加厉的过程――从20世纪70年代号召施加道德压力，80年代实施经济制裁，至90年代进行军事干预――时，我们早就应该对美国的宗旨进行重新定义，并围绕着目标与方法之间的关系展开对话。但这是留给未来的。现今，大西洋联盟的可信度既已确立，我们就必须将它贯彻到底――若有必要，则可派出地面部队――直至塞族军队撤出科索沃，难民被允许返回家园。

　　矛盾在于，美国自以为是在人类普遍价值的名义下所做的一切，在太多的其他国家看来，却是武断的、师出无名的、和专横跋扈的。对我们外交政策中占主导地位的出发点重新予以检讨，这已是迫在眉睫。而对于在过去18个月中只注重战术而轻视战略、仅致力于治表而忽略治本的克林顿政府来说，要做到这一点着实有些勉为其难了。

The ill-considered war in Kosovo has undermined relations with China and Russia and put NATO at risk.

By Henry A. Kissinger

A war at the far edge of the BaIkans has had political consequences extending far beyond Kosovo. In Russia, an outraged sense of humiliation over NATO's actions has spread from the elites to the population at large and threatens to blight U.S.-Russian relations for years to come. In Beijing, the virulent reaction to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade has vented frustrations with the roller-coaster nature of Sino-American relations that have accumulated for many months.

The causes in Russia and China are plain enough. Their leaders are products of societies that interpret decisions about war and peace according to whether they enhance a nation's security or other vital interests. If they can discern no such traditional rationale to U.S. behavior, they ascribe our motives not to altruism but to a hidden agenda for domination.

The formative experiences of the Clinton administration's key personnel were either in the trenches of the Vietnam protest movement, or in presidential campaigns-or both. Suspicious of the role of power in foreign policy, they use it ineffectively and without conviction. They emphasize the so-called "soft' issues, like the environment, and have little concern with notions of the international equilibrium or of traditional U.S. interests, which they scorn as outdated. Obsessively driven by public-opinion polls, they are ever tempted to treat foreign policy as an extension of domestic politics. Their diplomacy is quite skillful in dealing with short-term tactical issues but obtuse with respect to strategy; adept at "spinning" public opinion but oblivious to a generation's worth of lessons about the limitations of air power and the futility of notions of "graduated escalation."

Rambouillet was not a negotiation-as is often claimed-but an ultimatum. This marked an astounding departure for an administration that had entered office proclaiming its devotion to the U.N. Charter and multilateral procedures. The transformation of the Alliance from a defensive military grouping into an institution prepared to impose its values by force occurred in the same months that three former Soviet satellites joined NATO. It undercut repeated American and allied assurances that Russia had nothing to fear from NATO expansion, since the Alliance’s own treaty proclaimed it to be a purely defensive institution.

Kosovo has thereby become a symbol of Russia's post-cold-war frustrations. The tribulations of Yugoslavia, Moscow's traditional friend (leaving aside the interruption of the Tito years), emphasized Russia's decline and have generated a hostility toward America and the West that may produce a nationalist and socialist Russia-akin to the European Fascism of the l930s. This would be a sorry end for the administration's po1icy of supporting Russian reform and coaxing Russia closer to the West.

TO its credit, the administration from the beginning has recognized the importance of bringing Russia into the international community. But it has identified this effort primarily with democratic reform and market economics inside Russia and non-proliferation abroad. All this accentuates the Russian sense of having come under a kind of colonial tutelage. Russia, in turn, has clung to many aspects of its traditional diplomacy: seeking to reduce our influence, especially in the Middle East. Russia's image of itself as an historic player on the world stage must be taken seriously. This requires less lecturing and more dialogue; less sentimentality and more recognition that Russia's national interests are not always congruent with ours; less sociology and more foreign policy.

Before the attack on its Belgrade embassy, China's reaction to the air war was more muted than Russia's-but equally negative. Every nation views international events through the prism of its history. And to China, the new NATO doctrine of humanitarian intervention evokes Europe's unilaterally proclaimed civilizing mission in the l9th century, which led to the fragmentation of China and a series of Western interventions.

That policy of close ties between the United States and China is now questioned in both capitals. President Clinton's policy has built on the conviction of all his predecessors since Richard Nixon that both China and the United States have much to gain from cooperation and risk exhausting themselves by confrontation. For China, a breakdown in relations would deal a severe blow to its economic program and modernization. For America, it would ensure turmoil throughout Asia, leaving I China's neighbors torn by the need to choose between the world's most populous country, whose 5,000 years of history give it a special place in Asia, and America, the world's only superpower.

The bombing of the Belgrade embassy was the match that set off the explosion. Mutual suspicions fed on each other.

The critics of a cooperative China policy fall into two camps. The first group holds that the emergence of China as a major power automatically threatens American vital interests. A second group is concerned about specific Chinese policies from human rights to proliferation. To be sure, China's actions on many fronts reflect the unsentimental policy of an emerging power. Nevertheless, Sino-American disagreements can be kept short of confrontation by patient and firm diplomacy. And there are many areas of congruent interests. If, in the absence of a direct challenge, the emergence of China as a major power and its political system are turned into the occasion for American hostility we will be embarked on a lonely course without support from any major nation in either Europe or Asia. I would warn against such an adventure that will distort our Asian policy for decades.

Despite the seeming unity of the NATO summit, Kosovo has made a debate about the Alliance's future inevitab1e.

The issues ducked at the NATO summit brook no further delay. Specifically, what is the proper mission of NATO in so-called "out of area" conflicts? What are the relative roles of Europe and America? Does the Alliance have a serious political
or military strategy for stabilizing parts of Europe or adjacent strategic regions?

No issue is more in need of rethinking than the concept of humanitarian intervention put forward as the administration's contribution to a new approach to foreign policy. The air war in Kosovo is justified as establishing the principle that the international community-or at least NATO-wi1l henceforth punish the transgressions of governments against their own people. But we did not do so in Algeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Croatia, Rwanda, the Caucasus, the Kurdish areas and many other regions. And what will be our attitude to emerging ethnic conflicts in Asia, for example in Indonesia and the Philippines? The answer often given is that we act where we are able to without undue risk, not elsewhere. But what are the criteria for this distinction? And what kind of humanism expresses its reluctance to suffer military casualties by devastating the civilian economy of its adversary for decades to come?

Moral principles are expressed in absolutes. But foreign policy must forever be concerned with reconciling ends and means. The fact that ethnic cleansing is repugnant does not obviate the need to devise the most appropriate response. At every stage of the Kosovo tragedy, other mixes of diplomacy and force were available, though it is not clear they were ever seriously considered. A strategy that vindicates its moral convictions only from altitudes above 15,000 feet -- and in the process devastates Serbia and makes Kosovo unlivable -- has already produced more refugees and casualties than any conceivable alternative mix of force and diplomacy would have. It deserves to be questioned on both political and moral grounds.

The United States can take pride in elevating human rights to an integral part of foreign policy. But when one observes the progression from the call for moral pressure of the l970s, to economic sanctions in the l980s, to military intervention in the l990s, the time has come to call for a definition of purposes and a dialogue on the relationship between objectives and methods. But this is for the future. Now that the credibility of the Atlantic Alliance has been staked, we must persist -- with ground troops if necessary -- until Serb military forces leave Kosovo and the refugees are allowed to return.

The paradox is that a country that thinks of itself as acting in the name of universal values is seen by too many others as acting arbitrarily, or inexplicably, or arrogantly. A re-examination of the prevailing premises of our foreign policy is overdue. This is a tall order for the last l8 months of an administration heretofore more given to tactics than strategy, more to Band-Aids than to healing.

Newsweek International, May 31, 1999